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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the appropriate role of Korean peacekeepers in post-conflict 
societies and the function of the troop-contributing government of Korea in leading 
successful peace operations.  It examines scholarly discussions regarding peacekeeping 
success—including conditions and criteria for successful peacekeeping—and applies the 
factors regarding mandates to Korean peace operations in East Timor and Lebanon.  The 
two country case studies view the results of Korean peace operations from a long-term 
perspective, applying relevant evaluation factors closely related to the nature of 
peacekeeping force activities, and avoiding evaluations based on reports from local media 
and Korean pro-governmental news networks.  For successful peace operations, troop-
contributing governments should clearly and narrowly order the scope of force activities 
regardless of the specific field of activity.  Despite claims that use of force is needed in 
more violent contemporary situations, rigorous adherence to the rule of engagement by 
military contingents will likely create positive outcomes if the force employs friendship-
building efforts along with security operations.  However, for more fruitful efforts in 
peacekeeping operations, the military troops and their government should be more 
deliberate regarding capacity-building activities to most benefit sustainable development 
and local ownership. 
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A. KOREA’S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS   
Korea is widely perceived as playing a positive role in world affairs.1  Consistent 
with its growing international importance, Korea is attempting to increase its 
contributions to Official Development Assistance (ODA) to reduce poverty in developing 
countries, and to peacekeeping operations (PKO) to maintain international peace and 
security. 2   In 2009, the Korean National Assembly passed a bill to expand PKO 
participation.  It allows Korean armed forces to be dispatched upon the request of the 
United Nations (UN) without prior consent by the National Assembly.  South Koreans 
see their country poised to adopt the image of a “Pacifist Middle Power.”3  And there is a 
feeling among Koreans that they should reciprocate for the international assistance the 
country received after the Korean War.4 
Along with these trends within Korea, the international community has requested 
that South Korea play a greater role in maintaining and improving world peace.  
Although South Korea is the world’s eleventh largest monetary contributor to the UN, it 
sends very few participants to post-conflict societies, ranking 32nd in troop contribution.5   
 
 
                                                 
1 SeungJu Lee et al., Assessments and Supplements of Contribution Diplomacy (Seoul: National 
Assembly Research Service, 2010), 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Seongryeol Cho, “The Role of Korean Army and International Peace Cooperation Activity in 
Transitional Period,” Institute for National Security Strategy, Vol. 3, 2007, 2. Seongryeol suggests the term 
“Pacific Middle Power,” a synthesis of “Peace Country” and “Middle Power,” is a desirable new 
diplomatic strategy and national vision for Korea.  He argues that Korea should pursue niche diplomacy, 
seeking an independent role in the international community while promoting the development of its 
alliance with the United States. 
4 Kyudok Hong, “South Korean Experiences in Peacekeeping and Plan for the Future,” Conflict 
Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 12, 174. 
5 Official Webpage of UN’s Peacekeeping Activities, “Ranking of Military and Police Contributions 
to UN Operations,” http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/feb11_2.pdf. 
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The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has asked South Korea to expand the Korean 
role in the international community by sending more troops on peacekeeping missions.  
Recently, he urged the Korean government to deploy another Korean peacekeeping force 
to Sudan.6 
As a result of these internal and external influences, and consistent with its 
growing economic importance, Korea is stepping up its responsibility in international 
peacekeeping operations.  In the face of increasing pressure to send more Korean troops 
to post-conflict societies, it is worth investigating how successful Korean troops have 
been in past operations and what more appropriate actions they could take in future 
deployments.  The importance of this topic lies in identifying channels for more 
productive Korean contributions to international peace.  This requires reviewing and 
evaluating previous Korean force activities in post-conflict societies and using the lessons 
learned to provide recommendations for adjusting future Korean missions. 
B. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESES 
The Korean government and many Korean news organizations report that the 
missions of South Korean troops deployed in post-conflict societies have been a success.  
But it is important to go beyond reputation in order to objectively evaluate the efforts of 
military contingents, using success indicators relevant to peacekeeping activities in war-
torn societies.  This requires determining what standards produce successful military 
contingent activities in peacekeeping. 
Can the objectives stated in the Korean National Assembly’s motion regarding 
sending military troops abroad be the standard to guide the military contingents’ conduct 
in peace operations?  The Agreement of the National Assembly for Deploying the Korean 
Force to East Timor states that the purpose of deploying Korean military forces is to 
contribute to regional stability in the Asia-Pacific region and to contribute actively to the 
UN’s international peacekeeping activities as a UN member state and a beneficiary 
                                                 
6 The Chosunilbo, “UN Chief Calls for Korean Peacekeepers in South Sudan,” June 27, 2011, 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/07/27/2011072701048.html.  
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country. 7   This document offers no specific direction for military missions beyond 
promoting peace and security in East Timor, assisting and supporting the UN Mission in 
East Timor (UNAMET), and supporting humanitarian rescue and assistance operations.8  
These objectives and commands are too sketchy to define the specific direction of 
military force in peacekeeping.  Likewise, The Agreement of the National Assembly for 
Deploying the Korean Force to Lebanon also lacks specifics, outlining broad, general 
objectives and assignments like contributing to international peace and maintaining 
security.9  It seems that the original objectives stated in the deployment of the PKO 
cannot serve as an objective standard against which to measure success. 
Regarding the original objectives of peacekeeping operations, the UN officially 
says only that a peacekeeping mission works “to create the conditions for lasting peace in 
a country torn by conflict,” with no clear elucidation of what constitutes such 
conditions.10  Is the mission a success when the military acts in accordance with UN 
founding principles?  The foundational purpose of the UN is “to maintain international 
peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to promote social 
progress for better living standards and human rights.”11  These standards are still too 
broad and vague for evaluating military actions in PKO. 
Can fulfillment of the mandates from UN Peacekeeping Force Headquarters 
(PKFH) serve as the standard?  To some extent, orders from PKFH do define the 
activities of subordinated military contingents from many different countries.  However, 
these orders are modified constantly in response to the situation in the field.  Indeed, the 
Korean peacekeeping force in Lebanon amended its operational plans and rules on 
average more than 35 times during the relatively modest 6-month deployment of each 
                                                 
7 The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, The Agreement of the National Assembly for 
Deploying the Korean Force to East-Timor, September. 28, 1999, http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/. 
8 Ibid. 
9 The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, The Agreement of the National Assembly for 
Deploying the Korean Force to Lebanon, Dec. 22, 2006, http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/. 
10 Official Webpage of UN’s peacekeeping activities, “What is Peacekeeping?” 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtm.l 
11 Charter of the United Nations, “The UN Charter1: Purposes and Principles, Article 1,” 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. 
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contingent.12  Moreover, on-site mandates from PKFH cannot define the general and 
fundamental direction of military peacekeepers’ activities from various countries. 
If there were specific mandates from its own government, a military peacekeeping 
contingent would most likely give priority to those mandates in implementing its mission 
in the field.  Governmental mandates ordering specific directions for force activities 
would greatly influence the result of the forces’ actions in the field. 
Hypothesis 1: The Korean peacekeeping forces considered their governmental 
mandates as the most important standard of their action on the spot, which greatly 
impacted the results of their activities in post-conflict societies. 
Because the sketchy, broadly defined directions in the National Assembly’s action 
and the official UN objective of PKO do not provide appropriate standards for military 
contingent actions, the mandate from the government must be more specifically and 
narrowly defined.  Such clearly mandated orders might yield more successful results in 
the military force’s activities in peacekeeping. 
Hypothesis 2: A clear mandate with suitable scope and contents results in 
successful outcomes of military force peacekeeping activity. 
In other words, the success of Korean peacekeeping activities rests not on the 
official United Nations mandate per se, but on to the degree to which the supporting 
Korean government mandate defined clearly the activities expected of the Korean troops 
in terms of both scope and content. Detailed discussions of a mandate and its contents 
follow in Chapter II. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Criteria for Evaluating Peacekeeping Success 
There has been much discussion about what conditions produce successful 
peacekeeping operations.  This discussion includes such variables as assistance from the 
international community, the role of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, 
                                                 
12 For instance, the second Korean contingent in Lebanon had to overall modify its operation plan five 
times and to partly amend 29 times. 
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the absence of external support for the belligerents, levels of economic development, and 
more.13  In particular, the UN judges that when several key factors—correct diagnosis of 
the problem, speedy deployment, and so forth—are in place, the probability of a 
successful PKO is increased. 14   However, how to judge the success or failure of 
peacekeeping operations is mostly overlooked in the lengthy discussion of 
peacekeeping.15 
Full-fledged debates erupted after the announcement of An Agenda for Peace by 
the United Nations Secretary-General in 1992.16  Several peacekeeping scholars agreed 
with the need for clear analysis of the success or failure of UN missions so as to improve 
peacekeeping capabilities.  Paul Diehl, William Durch and Steven Ratner stress standards 
related to the mission’s mandate and factors that can be measured quantitatively, with a 
more positive approach to evaluating peacekeeping. 17   On the other hand, Betts 
Fetherston and Robert Johansen emphasize the need for qualitative examination, 
attributing peacekeeping success to the promotion of deeper normative values like justice 
and the reduction of human suffering.18 
                                                 
13 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 
2004, 275; Darya Pushkina, “United Nations Peacekeeping in Civil Wars: Conditions for Success” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Maryland, 2002), 15–36. 
14 Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General of the UN, “United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation: Current Development and Future Challenges,” Address, June 12, 2002, Washington, DC. 
15 Important works that attempt to answer this questions include Duane Bratt, “Assessing the Success 
of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 1996, 64; Daniel Druckman 
et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, 1997, 151; 
Duane Bratt, “Defining peacekeeping success: The Experience of UNTAC,” Peacekeeping and 
International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1996, 3. 
16 Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations are one option to solve conflicts. UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented a 24-page report, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping.  This report emphasizes a clear and practicable mandate, the cooperation 
of the parties in implementing that mandate, the continuing support of the Security Council, and so on. 
(Marjorie Ann Browne, “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, 
2008, 21). 
17 Daniel Druckman et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” 151–152. 
18 Ibid. 
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Seeking more systematic criteria for measuring success, Diehl develops two 
standards: limitation of armed conflict and facilitating conflict resolution.19  With respect 
to the first criterion, Diehl believes that peacekeepers can prevent and manage conflicts 
between opposing parties because the peacekeepers represent the international 
community. 20   He argues that containment of armed conflict should be one of the 
objective indicators measuring the success of peacekeeping operations.  In terms of his 
second criterion for gauging the success of peacekeeping, Diehl stresses the ability of 
peacekeepers to create conditions for negotiation between rival parties.  Since negotiators 
can better concentrate on peace talks and reconciliation in a secure environment, Diehl’s 
second factor, assisting “conflict resolution,” should be considered important in assessing 
the success or failure of peacekeeping operations.21 
Ratner sets up ten major categories of responsibility for new UN peacekeeping 
and establishes a depth of responsibility with six categories that range from monitoring to 
providing public information. 22   When Ratner emphasizes conflict prevention and 
inducing resolution as fundamental functional roles for mediators, his stance is similar to 
Diehl’s with respect to evaluating a successful mission. 23   However, Ratner counts 
mandate fulfillment as another measure of mission success, while Diehl claims that 
“mandate fulfillment” cannot be considered a measure of success due to both the 
ambiguity of operational mandates and the difficulty of objectively assessing whether 
they have been achieved or not.24 
Durch admits that Diehl’s two criteria offer useful benchmarks and starting points 
to evaluate successful peacekeeping, but Durch asserts that peace accords cannot be 
                                                 
19 Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 
34–40. 
20 Paul Diehl et al., Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 30. 
21 Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 37. 
22 Ibid.,42–43. 
23 Steven Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 42–43. Ratner stresses the following critical mediation mechanisms: 
face-saving and escape routes, redefinition of issues, containment of dispute, and follow-through on 
resolution. 
24 Paul Diehl, International Peacekeeping, 33; Daniel Druckman et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping 
Missions,”152. 
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framed from one universal standard.25  Durch includes the fulfillment of the mandate 
among the elements for evaluating missions because the mandates establish the 
characteristics of the mission.26  Since the publication of the UN’s Agenda for Peace, 
most scholars who emphasize evaluation by objective factors include “contribution to 
peace resolution” as a central criterion, though they differ on the criterion of “mandate 
performance” because of the ambiguity of mandates. 
The most controversial objections to Diehl’s two criteria are raised by Johansen.  
In a review of Diehl’s International Peacekeeping, Johansen finds fault with Diehl’s first 
criterion by demonstrating that missions can be successful despite the absence of “peace 
resolution.” 27   While emphasizing that qualitative information must be examined 
alongside quantifiable data, Johansen suggests two additional considerations. First, there 
is a need to “assess the effect of peacekeeping forces on local people affected by the 
peacekeepers’ work.”  Second, there is a need to “compare the degree of 
misunderstanding, tension, or violence that occurs in the presence of UN peacekeepers to 
the estimated results of balance-of-power activity without peacekeeping.”28  These two 
indicators reflect the question, “Success for whom?” 
Discussions of criteria for evaluating peacekeeping missions are outlined by Bratt 
in his article “Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations.”29  Bratt picks 
three of the five factors identified by Brown and Diehl—mandate performance, 
facilitating conflict resolution, and conflict containment—and adds one other, “limiting 
casualties,” noting that peacekeepers can curtail the overall rate of casualties as well as 
                                                 
25 William Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 36. 
26 Ibid., 28–29: Durch emphasizes that “what an operation is asked to do has much to do with its 
success or failure. Historically, it is good at fulfilling certain mandates at following missions: monitoring 
borders, verifying cease-fire and so on.” 
27 Robert Johansen, “UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success?” Mershon International 
Studies Review, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1994, 308. 
28 Ibid., 309–310. 
29 Duane Bratt, “Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations.” 
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military losses because peacekeeping operations can limit civilian casualties if the 
mandate includes instructions related to humanitarian work.30  
Recent discussion concerning evaluation of peacekeeping success embraces a 
more humanitarian perspective and the impact of the conflict beyond the original conflict 
area.  Pushkina adds two factors to existing judgments of successful peacekeeping—
“reduction of human suffering” and “preventing the spread of conflict beyond the home 
state’s borders.”31  Since the UN is responsible for preventing massacres of civilians, the 
work of peacekeepers has to be assessed in terms of a decrease in human rights abuses 
and an increase in refugee resettlement.32  In Africa, where conflicts often spread to 
adjacent regions because of interconnected ethnic and economic factors, refugee flows, 
and diasporas, limiting the spread of conflicts to bordering countries should be among the 
factors used to measure success in peacekeeping operations.  
In short, the peacekeeping literature does not produce consensus on the criteria for 
assessing peacekeeping operations, as such assessments are framed according to varying 
beliefs by actors from the United Nations, peacekeepers, and host country citizens about 
the appropriate role for peacekeeping operations. 33   However, among scholars who 
emphasize objective factors in assessing the success or failure of missions, the following 
criteria are significant: fulfillment of the mandate, facilitating conflict resolution, 
limitation of conflict and casualties, and contribution to international and regional 
security.  In contrast, researchers who require qualitative assessment advocate use of the 
following criteria: influence on local people, reduction of human suffering, and lessening 
in the degree of tension or violence due to the presence of peacekeepers.  Although 
academics’ choice of criteria differs, they hold several themes in common.   
                                                 
30 Duane Bratt, “Explaining Peacekeeping Performance: The UN in Internal Conflicts,” International 
Peacekeeping, Vol.4, Issue 3, 1997, 46. 
31 Darya Pushkina, “Towards Successful Peace-Keeping: Remembering Croatia,” Cooperation and 
Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 39, No. 4, 395. 
32 Ibid., 396. 
33 Alex J. Bellamy, “The ‘Next Stage’ in Peace Operations Theory?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 
11, No. 1, 2004, 21. 
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According to the forum of the National Research Council, since different actors have 
different criteria for assessing success, determining whose objectives should prevail is 
another variable in this complex drama.34 
Although several scholars make an effort to evaluate the overall mission of 
peacekeeping, there is little research on the activities of each peacekeeping component in 
post-conflict societies.  There has been little research assessing mission accomplishment 
of donor military forces—the actual peacekeepers operating in the field.  If the UN were 
to judge the success or failure of donors country-by-country or troops-by-troops, some 
hackles would be raised, possibly resulting in increased tension between the UN and 
troop-contributing countries, withdrawal of troops by countries who get low points, or 
denial of forces by these countries in later missions.  The voluntary provision of forces 
from UN members is the most important requirement for managing peacekeeping 
operations. 
The foregoing discussion shows that neither the objective criteria in assessing the 
activities of military troops nor the standard to be followed by peacekeeping military 
contingents are clearly defined or designated.  In addition, despite various debates on the 
best approach to peacekeeping operations, there are few discussions of the impact of 
mandates on peacekeeper activities and specifically how mandates from troop-
contributing governments affect military contingents’ peacekeeping success.  Scholars 
disagree on whether fulfillment of mandates should be an evaluation criterion for 
peacekeeping success.  So, if the mandates from troop-contributing governments are 
specifically defined in terms of scope and content, could these mandates be an 
appropriate standard for military contingents in conducting their missions in the field?  
The answer seems to be “Yes,” and this standard is adopted for assessing the case studies 
described in this thesis. 
                                                 
34 Daniel Druckman et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,”163. 
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2. South Korean Scholarship on Peacekeeping 
To date, the few demands to study Korea’s PKO have led to an equally short 
supply of studies.35  Korean studies of its PKO tend to center around its diplomatic 
effects.  In a policy research paper for the National Assembly, Seungju Lee and Hyejung 
Lee assert a need to expand participation in PKO as a national contribution to 
diplomacy. 36   Kyeongman Jun also claims that the contribution to diplomacy via 
participation in peacekeeping operations underlines “a realization of national value, and 
assurance of national security, or the reinforcement of a state’s image as long-term 
objectives.”37  Some experts discuss PKO as a method of preventive diplomacy, and 
some say that Korea has to utilize PKO to propagate a national image of rapid 
development as another way to promote Korea’s soft power diplomacy.38  Some say 
Korea needs to expand and improve its UN PKO because it significantly broadens 
Korea’s diplomatic horizons.39 
Compared to the various discussions about PKO as a means of diplomacy, there 
are few studies of the content and focus of Korean military efforts in post-conflict 
societies.  Also not discussed is the role Korean troops should play in helping 
development of the local societies to which they are dispatched.  Moreover, there have 
been no discussions of the government’s role in making peacekeeping (PK) activities 
successful by properly orienting its forces’ activities. 
                                                 
35 Jekuk Jun, “Oversee Deployment of Korean Forces and Security on the Korean Peninsula,” 
National Strategy, Vol.17, No.2, 2011. 
36 SeungJu Lee et al., Assessments and Supplements of Contribution Diplomacy (Seoul: National 
Assembly Research Service, 2010). 
37 Kyeongman Jun, “Political Appraisal and Development way of PKO in Contribution Diplomacy,” 
Defense Policy Study, Vol.26, No.2, Summer 2010. 
38 Sangtu Ko et al., “Conflict Management in the Post-Cold War Era: Preventive Diplomacy and 
PKO,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol.17, No.2, Fall, 2005; Sookjong Lee, “South Korea’s 
Soft Power Diplomacy,” EAI Issue Briefing, Jun. 1, 2009. 
39 Soonchun Lee, “Korea’s Diplomatic Tasks to Become a Global Korea,” Korean Observations on 
Foreign Relations, Vol.11, No.1, 2009. 
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The Korean PKO Center, established in 2005, has held seminars on subjects such 
as PKO participation strategy contributing to national interests, led by Yeolsu Kim;40 
methods to gather public support for PKO, led by Jongchan Kim;41 and avenues to build a 
legal basis for PKO participation, led by Sungho Je.42  Kyudok Hong, in particular, 
emphasizes expanding Korean participation in PKO in order to increase the country’s 
stabilization operation capability in advance of a sudden change in North Korea.43   
Finding successful standardized models to which troop-contributing countries 
may refer before sending their troops is an important goal for countries that wish to 
improve the reputation of their efforts within the international community and local 
societies.  Additionally, in order to help peacekeeping forces contribute to more stable 
circumstances and long-term development in post-conflict societies, peacekeeping forces 
need suggestions for values or guidelines. 
Studies evaluating the overall success or failure of missions deserve further 
development, but the activities of military contingents at the tactical level in post-conflict 
societies should be examined just as closely.  Research on what activities and roles are 
truly needed from Korean forces deployed in post-conflict societies will benefit 
population rehabilitation and reconstruction of the local society, and also build the long-
term positive image of Korea’s PKO in the international community. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines the activities of Korean forces dispatched to East Timor and 
Lebanon.  In the post-Cold War era, the international community has become much more 
involved in civil conflicts—beyond “traditional peacekeeping” in interstate conflicts—in 
                                                 
40 Yeolsu Kim, “PKO Participation Strategy to Contribute National Interests” (paper presented at the 
seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, June, 2005). 
41 Jongchan Kim, “Ways to Gather Public Support for PKO” (paper presented at the seminar for PKO, 
Seoul, Korea, Jun., 2005). 
42 Sungho Je, “Avenues to Build a Legal Basis for PKO Participation” (paper presented at the seminar 
for PKO, Seoul, Korea, Oct., 2006). 
43 Kyudok Hong, “Shed Light on Korean Participation in PKO and Development Ways for the Future” 
(paper presented at the seminar for PKO, Seoul, Korea, Mar., 2008). 
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which a multidimensional role is required even of military contingents.44  An increase in 
savage civil wars with ethnic and political turmoil requires the UN to participate in more 
aggressive peace operations, like peace enforcement and humanitarian relief.  In recent 
conflicts, peacekeeping has called for combat forces that can implement diverse tasks 
while protecting vulnerable local populations and the peacekeepers themselves.45 
The Korean deployment of troops to Somalia in support of a UN resolution was 
the first time since the Vietnam War that Republic of Korea forces operated overseas.  
However, the deployments to East Timor and Lebanon are the only cases in which 
combat troops were the bulk of the forces deployed.   Korean forces provided medical aid 
or supported reconstruction as their main mission in their other deployments, but the 
principle objective of the Korean forces in East Timor and Lebanon was maintaining 
security and peace, with civil-military activities as additional duties. 
In July 2010 Korea established the “Onnuri Force,” a standby military unit for 
overseas dispatch composed of 1,000 infantry units, 1,000 preparatory units, and 1,000 of 
engineering, transportation, and medical corps assistance units.46  Given the size and 
organization of this new military unit and the six-month rotation of military forces in 
PKO, future Korean PKO formations will likely be combat-battalion size.  Thus, the East 
Timor and Lebanon cases can provide relevant lessons in preparing for future experiences. 
Each case is explored in two major sections—security activity and civil-military 
activity.  Both peacekeeping forces consisted mainly of infantry soldiers.  They had two 
separate missions—restoring and maintaining order as their basic mission, and civil-
military operation as a secondary mission.  Separate indicators are used to evaluate 
success.  In assessment of security activities, indicators are utilized which show 
improvement or deterioration of the security situation, such as crime rates and some 
contextual information regarding security.  To assess civil-military activities, estimating 
                                                 
44 Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration 
of Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2, June 2004, 269. 
45 James H. Lebovic, “Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the 
Cold War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 6, December, 2004, 910. 
46 Jinsub Cho, “Quick Response to the Requests of Troops Dispatch from the International 
Community: Establishment of 'Onnuri force',” Defense Journal, Vol. 440, August. 2010, 46–47. 
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factors based on the nature of the activities are used.  For instance, in the case of 
capacity-building activities, an indicator is whether key concepts like ownership or 
sustainability were achieved in the local populations.  There is detailed discussion of 
evaluation indicators within each case study. 
Primary sources include “Homecoming Reports” by military officers who worked 
in East Timor and Lebanon as peacekeepers, documentation following the return of 
deployed units, and official documents and research papers from the Ministry of Defense 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in South Korea.  Official United Nations’ documents 
concerning peacekeeping activities in East Timor and Lebanon are also used in this study.  
These sources are used to find out the Korean forces’ specific activities and results. 
Secondary sources dealing with subjects regarding the PKO are used to establish a 
theoretical framework for the course and scope of research.  The UN database and 
website, reports issued by the UN, and published Korean reports about PKO and Korean 
troop activities are utilized.  Academic papers, journals, and scholarly books are 
referenced when applicable. 
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II. MANDATES AND MISSION IMPLEMENTATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review in Chapter I summarizes the discussions of evaluation 
criteria for assessing the success or failure of peacekeeping operations.  Whether 
“fulfillment of the mandate” should be used to assess peacekeeping is especially 
controversial. 
Some scholars do not believe in evaluating peacekeeping success by assessing the 
fulfillment of the UN mandate.  Diehl says that the vagueness of mandates stems from 
political considerations, arguing that the ambiguity is “the price of approval in a 
multilateral coalition.”47  However, because the UN, as the acknowledged representative 
of the world’s governments, contributes to and legitimizes international peace, the 
success of the mandate is an important indicator for assessing peace operations.  Even 
Diehl acknowledges that the mandate cannot help being a critical factor for success, 
because the mandate is the starting point for setting standards for the different missions of 
peace operations.48  He notes that the success of peacekeeping is frequently confirmed by 
the completion of the missions given to each peacekeeping component.49 
Bellamy says that the fulfillment of the mandates as a measure of peacekeeping 
success has “the advantage of remaining sensitive to different varieties of peace 
operation.” 50   Measuring how well a peace operation accomplishes its mandate is 
appropriate for evaluating different types of operations with different aims.51  That is, 
fulfillment of mandate can be used as a success indicator regardless of mission type. 
                                                 
47 Daniel Druckman et al., “Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions,” 152. 
48 Paul F. Diehl, Peace Operations, 123. 
49 Ibid., 122–123. 
50 Alex J. Bellamy et al., “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace 
Operations,” International Security, Vol. 29, No, 4, Spring 2005, 175. 
51 Ibid. 
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Many agree that the mandate itself is a condition for a successful peacekeeping 
mission.  Since encouraging conflict resolution depends heavily on how well the mission 
achieves its mandate, an appropriate mandate should be regarded as a necessary condition 
of peace operations.52  Especially for peacekeepers who discharge their duty in the field, 
the mandate is a very significant factor in mission success because it influences “the 
characteristics of the field situation, what they call the ‘ground truth’.”53 
How must a mandate be defined if it is to guide a successful peacekeeping 
operation?  Analysts focus on two elements: the scope of the mandate and the content of 
the mandate. 
B. THE SCOPE OF MANDATES 
The scope of mandate refers to whether the peacekeeping mandate from the 
authorities is specific versus vague and ambiguous, or narrow versus broad.54 
A clear mandate is important for peacekeepers, Durch says, because, historically 
and empirically, ambiguous or incomplete mandates render a simple mission more 
difficult and a difficult mission unworkable.55  A mandate that does not stipulate what 
peacekeepers should do on the spot leaves room for arbitrary interpretation and 
performance by field components when the operational situation deteriorates.56  Durch 
gives the example of Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold’s difficulty implementing the 
ambiguous mandate for the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC), a case also 
explored by Lefever in Uncertain Mandate.  The initial ONUC mandate directed 
Hammarskjold to “take the necessary steps” and report back “as appropriate.” 57  
                                                 
52 Nicholas Sambanis, “The United Nations Operations in Cyprus: A New Look at the Peacekeeping-
Peacemaking Relationship,” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1999, 81. 
53 William Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 26. 
54 A mandate can be both broad and specific. 
55 William Durch, 26. 
56 Ibid., 27. 
57 Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1967), 27. William Durch, 27, “Its initial mandate of July 1960 authorized Hammarskjold 
to ‘provide the Government with such military assistance as may necessary until…the national security 
forces may be able to fully meet their tasks…’” 
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Interpreting the Security Council resolution and establishing the rules of the operation 
were left to Hammarskjold, who could not implement the mission without violating one 
or another of the resolution’s clauses; the ambiguity also resulted in several skirmishes.58  
Mandates reflect a political calculus in the Security Council, so vague mandates are often 
issued to encourage “veto-wielders” to agree to UN peace operations.59  But interpreting 
vague mandates complicates and confuses field peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping failures due 
to unclear mandates are an obvious reason to support clearer and more specific mandates. 
A clear and detailed mandate sets the expectations of the actors involved and 
insures public support for the peacekeeping mission, according to Diehl.60  He lists 
ONUC, the Multi-National Force (MNF) in Lebanon, and the United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as failures due to vague mandates, whereas the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) operations and United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP) are successful missions that benefitted from “clear and distinctly 
limited mandates.”  Open-ended mandates can lead peacekeepers to abandon neutrality 
and self-defense, the keystones of peacekeeping.61  Other scholars also point to problems 
with vague mandates.  Ghali discusses the drawbacks of an unclear mandate in her 
research on UNEF 1 and UNEF 2.62  In her case study on UNIFIL, she cautions against a 
peacekeeper’s partial understanding of the mandate as well as local parties applying their 
own interpretation.63   Mullenbach finds that when the mandate is defined narrowly 
(“limited in its scope”) peacekeeping operations are successful.64  Thakur agrees, saying 
                                                 
58 Ernest W. Lefever, 210. 
59 William Durch, 27. 
60 Ibid., 73 
61 Ibid., 74 
62 Mona Ghali, “United Nations Emergency Force 1: 1956–1967” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 113–115.; Mona Ghali, “United 
Nations Emergency Force 2: 1973–1979,” in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 137. 
63 Mona Ghali, “United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon: 1978–Present,” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 187.; Naomi Joy Weinberger, 
“Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer, 1983, 364. 
64 Mark J. Mullenbach, “Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the 
Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3, 
September 2005, 533. 
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that "peacekeeping is successful where it is limited to narrow, precisely defined tasks of 
over-seeing a military disengagement upon the cessation of hostilities, but fails when 
extended to embrace political tasks of conflict resolution.”65 
In contrast, Poppe offers unique guidelines for peacekeeping in light of his own 
experience in Cyprus.  Unlike most analysts, he supports “drawing the mandate in broad, 
flexible terms” because a broad, general mandate can induce the pervasiveness of mission 
activity. 66   In other words, a mandate defined in broad terms helps peacekeepers 
implement their mission through broad activities without limitations of operational 
scope.67 
A non-specific mandate renders even observation peacekeeping missions 
ineffective, so the peacekeepers follow accords other than the UN mandate.  With a 
vague and indirect UN mandate, United Nations Military Observer Group India Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP)’s real duties were elucidated in a bilateral national agreement between 
conflicting parties.68  Because of this additional accord, which was reinforced with even 
more specific orders, UNMOGIP can be evaluated as a successful mission.69  The scope 
of a mandate is closely related to the resources necessary for implementing it, including 
appropriate levels of military force and funding.  Birgisson points to the United Nations 
Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), which suffered a manpower shortage in 
carrying out its original mission.70 
The UN sponsors scholarly discussions of successful conditions for peace 
operations to analyze failures of past missions and propose far-reaching reforms of UN 
peace operations.  The Brahimi report says that vague and optimistic articles in mandates 
                                                 
65 Ramesh Thakur, Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International 
Commission (Edmonton, Alberta: The University of Alberta Press., 1984), 2. 
66 David H. Popper, “Lessons of United Nations Peacekeeping in Cyprus,” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 64, No. 4, September 1970, 5. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Karl Th. Birgisson, “UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan,” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 277. 
69 Ibid., 282. 
70 Karl Th. Birgisson, “United Nations Yemen Observation Mission,” in The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping, ed. William Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 211–215. 
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lead to inappropriate deployments with uncertain objectives, and urges the Security 
Council to adopt clear, attainable mandates backed with adequate resources.71 
Of course, there is some disagreement about which missions can be considered a 
success.  A mandate by itself cannot decisively influence the success or failure of 
peacekeeping missions.72  Yet, there is one clear point on which most scholars agree: 
“operations with clearly specified tasks are more likely to accomplish their missions 
successfully.”73  Broadly defined mandates make it difficult to allocate the level of 
resources and manpower needed for a successful mission, and historical evidence shows 
that an unclear mandate allows arbitrary interpretations by peacekeepers—as well as 
peacekepts74—and damages the neutrality and self-defense which are core principles of 
UN peace operations.  A specific and clear mandate discourages peacekepts from 
divergent expectations of the peacekeepers, and also helps gain public support from the 
disputing parties as well as from troop-contributing countries.   
C. THE CONTENT OF MANDATES 
The content of the mandate refers to the actual activities or the specific orders 
included in the mandate by the authorities of the peacekeeping operations.  In traditional 
peacekeeping operations, appropriate functions include “securing or maintaining a 
cessation of hostilities by providing a neutral third-party interposition or ‘buffer’ 
presence between opposing forces; maintaining public order, especially where outside 
intervention—in particular by great powers—is a possibility; and observing a cease- fire 
or truce, reporting any violations, often including diplomatic assistance in the execution 
of a political settlement.”75 
                                                 
71 James D. Fearon et al., “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,” International Security, 
Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, 17–18. 
72 Paul F. Diehl, Peace Operations, 133. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2008), 
8. Fortna follow Christopher Clapham in using the term peacekept to refer to “decision makers within the 
government and rebel organizations.” In this thesis I utilize the term peacekept to refer also to the local 
population under the peace operation.  
75 Richard W. Nelson, “Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model,” 
International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1984–1985, 82. 
 20
History points to the type of content for peacekeeping missions successfully 
implemented by the UN.  According to Durch, peacekeepers do well under certain 
mandates—“monitoring national borders for large-scale troop movements, verifying 
cease-fires between conventional armed forces, overseeing the subsequent separation of 
such forces, monitoring or supervising elections and mediating political transitions.76  On 
the other hand, peacekeeping efforts are less successful when they try to restore a 
government destroyed by conflict and guard against illegal weapons penetration. 77  
Durch points out that these failed functions reveal two problems: peacekeepers who had 
not maintained impartiality and lack of equipment for implementing missions.78 
During the Cold War, peacekeeping worked relatively well by providing a buffer 
zone between the conflicting parties and even facilitating peace negotiations—well 
enough to receive the 1998 Nobel Peace Prize.79  However, as peacekeeping evolves 
from the traditional mission to multi-dimensional missions including peacebuilding, 
peace enforcement, and humanitarian relief operations, 80  more variety and specific 
context for mandates is necessary.  With changes in the nature and demands of 
peacekeeping, the contents of mandates must also change.  Peacekeeping has become a 
catch-all phrase, covering much more than implementing and monitoring cease-fire 
agreements.81  Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping involves a wide range of 
tasks, including planning and managing elections, protecting human rights, supervising 
land reform, carrying out humanitarian aid under fire, and reconstructing failed states.82 
                                                 
76 William Durch, “Getting Involved: The Political-Military Context,” 28–29. 
77 Ibid., 29. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Shashi Tharoor, “The Changing Face of Peacekeeping,” in Soldiers for Peace ed. Barbara Benton 
(New York: Facts On File, 1996), 211–212. 
80 This classification follows Dr. Arturo Sotomayor, lecture on “From Peacekeeping to Peace-
enforcement,” Seminar in Peace Operations, Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. July 12, 2011. 
81 Shashi Tharoor, 212. 
82 The New York Times, “The Future of UN Peacekeeping,” January 12, 1995. 
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Doyle and Sambanis argue that PK mandates should address the characteristics of 
the conflict—whether it is a less hostile or more hostile environment. 83   Since the 
capability of the international community is strengthened by the mandate of a peace 
operation, the UN needs to issue a mandate appropriate to the conflict situation.84  With a 
data set of 124 post-World War II civil wars, Doyle and Sambanis tested the possibility 
of success in peacekeeping operations for four types of mandated operations: monitoring 
or observer missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping, and 
peace enforcement, finding that UN mandates for peace enforcement led to positive 
results in terms of ending a war. 85   For firmer success—minimum democratization 
without recurrence of war—their research points to mandates including multidimensional 
functions.86  This research suggests that the UN peacekeeping mandates should focus on 
enforcement operations and peacebuilding.87   A successful PK operation, Doyle and 
Sambanis claim, needs extensive mandates reflecting the multidimensional functions of 
UN peacekeeping. 
The necessary contents of mandates were thrashed out by the UN secretaries-
general in attempts to find a doctrine for UN peace operations—from the Agenda for 
Peace88 in 1992 to In Larger Freedom89 in 2005.  In order for the UN to continue 
meeting demands for peacekeeping operations, these two documents propose that 
mandates include post-conflict tasks such as, “support to the reestablishment of rule of 
law and security structures; the extension of state authority and the rehabilitation of local 
administration; the promotion of human rights; gender mainstreaming; the protection of 
                                                 
83 Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and 
Quantitative Analysis,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), 781. 




88 United Nations General Assembly, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peace-keeping (A/47/277–S/24111) (New York: United Nations, 1992).  
http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.  
89 United Nations General Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and 
Human Rights for All (A/59/2005) (New York: United Nations, 2005). 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/gaA.59.2005_En.pdf. 
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children associated with armed conflict; and support to the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.” 90   They acknowledge that peacekeepers should be mandated to prevent 
belligerents or spoilers from intimidating civilian populations.91 
With increasing demands for peace operations, peacekeepers tend to deploy 
where conflicts continue—places that are not in a military stalemate.  Peace operations 
demand not only deploying into post-conflict situations, but trying to create them.  For 
this, military contingents must be able to defend themselves and civilians from threats by 
belligerents.  This means that the UN mandates need a robust rule of engagement for 
military contingents so they do not yield the initiative to aggressors. 92   When 
peacekeepers are dispatched into potentially unsafe areas, Security Council Resolutions 
must provide strong mandates which meet the requirements of peacekeeping missions 
with specific articles on the use of force not only for self-defense but also to protect 
civilians and vulnerable populations.93 
Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21th Century searched for ways to 
improve the planning, conduct and efficiency of peacekeeping operations.  The 
Challenges Project continues to work with diverse organizations to enhance the broad 
abilities of international peacekeeping missions in response to the challenges of complex 
peace missions.  Because more than three-quarters of UN missions are implemented in 
weak and failed states, the project calls for mandates that “cover a wide spectrum of 
tasks.”94  This project argues that since contemporary peace operations occur in complex 
security, political and humanitarian circumstances, a proper peacekeeping directive must 
include a “broadening of mandate” with “the use of force.”95  In other words, the Security 
                                                 
90 Salman Ahmed et al. “Shaping the Future of UN Peace Operations: Is There a Doctrine in the 
House?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2007, 21. 
91 Ibid., 25. 
92 International Legal Materials, “United Nations: Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations,” Vol. 39, No. 6, November 2000, 1435. 
93 Clifford Bernath et al., “A Peacekeeping Success: Lessons Learned from UNAMIL,” in 
International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Brill Academic, 2005), 128–129. 
94 The Challenges Project, Meeting the Challenges of Peace Operations: Cooperation and 
Coordination (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005), 38. 
95 Ibid., 12. 
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Council should provide each mission with executive authority that matches difficult 
situations in fragile states, and the UN missions should be allowed to use active military 
force to deal with rule-of-law issues.96  
To sum up, discussions over the content of mandates have not just been about 
what kinds of contexts are needed in mandate for a successful mission.  However, many 
scholars and the UN itself have articulated “required contents” of mandates for 
contemporary missions, based on changes since the end of the Cold War.  Most call for 
use of force as necessary to restore law and order, and for providing the mission with 
mandates which guarantee its administrative authority in implementing peace and 
sustainable development in the post-conflict society. 
D. MANDATES FOR MILITARY CONTINGENTS IN PEACEKEEPING 
The Challenges Project notes that “those closest to the people affected by the 
conflict are critical to the success of any peace operations.”97  This implies that tactical 
success greatly influences overall peacekeeping success.  As shown in Table 1, military 
units are classified as among the components at the tactical level of responsibility.98 
 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 19. 
97 The Challenges Project, Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21th Century-Concluding Report 
1997–2002 (Stockholm: Elanders Gotab, 2005), 268. 
98 Ibid., 258. 
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Table 1. Levels of Responsibility in UN Peace Operation (From: The 
Challenges Project, 2005)99 
For peacekeeping military contingents in the field, the mandate is a significant 
factor in implementing their mission because the military is strongly governed by the 
limitations of its mission strategy.100  Military personnel are accustomed to implementing 
specifically articulated mandates 101  rather than creating the scope of their mission, 
themselves.  Therefore, I hypothesize that more specific and clearer mandates for military 
contingents are necessary for successful peacekeeping. 
Military forces are supposed to prepare an initial framework for overall 
peacekeeping operations.  Military forces in peacekeeping are responsible for law 
enforcement and therefore need a strong mandate—including active use of force—to 
create a more conducive situation for various civilian components.  Given the field 
situation and the required mission of protecting civilians from physical menace, I 
hypothesize that a mandate which authorizes robust use of military power leads to more 
successful peacekeeping by the military contingents. 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 
100 Oldrich Bures, “Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping,” International 
Studies Review, Vol. 9, 2007, 414. 
101 Alan James, “Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Journal, Vol. 50, No. 2, 
Spring 1995, 244. “Force commanders have criticized the imprecision of mandates.” 
Strategic Level 
 UN Security Council 
 UN Secretariat 
 Member states 
 Other international organizations 
Operational Level 
 SRSG/Special Envoy and staff 
 Force Commander and staff 
 Humanitarian Coordinator and staff 
 Civilian Administrator and staff 
 Police Commissioner and staff 
 NGO managing headquarters 
Tactical Level 
 Military units 
 International civilian police 
contingents 
 Cells from international 
organizations for specific 
purpose, e.g. election monitors 
 NGOs 
 Other international organizations 
 Special teams from member 
states, e.g. justice trainers 
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However, there is a “fantastic gap” between the UN mandate and the will of 
peacekeeping forces in the field.102  The UN provides a mandate but never tells the 
peacekeepers how to implement it.  This means that there are obvious limits to UNSC 
resolutions—even mandates issued by the UN mission—that directly impact military 
operations in the field.  It is worth noting that the UN does not give individual mandates 
to troop-contributing countries.  Furthermore, Operation Order (OPORD) of PKFH does 
not designate specific tasks for individual military contingents from different countries. 
With the exception of personnel for observation missions, military troops are 
more affected by orders from their own governments than by UN orders.  This is because 
the military contributions by member states are affected by political considerations, 
although the UN officially says that “the mandate is what member states are likely to bear 
and willing to commit to.”103  The motives of states in peacekeeping missions may differ 
from those articulated in the official mandate.104  Peacekeepers’ activities and accidents, 
especially personnel loss, greatly influence domestic politics and public opinion, so 
contributing governments seek to meddle in the military operations of their troops.  
Notoriously, military field commanders consider their own governments’ mandates more 
important than those of the peacekeeping mission commander. 
Thus, evaluating military forces’ activities in peacekeeping by the characteristics 
of their mandates requires closely examining the mandates ordered by the governments of 
troop-contributing countries. 
                                                 
102 The New York Times, “U.N. Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions,” 
December 31, 1993, A3. 
103 Harvey Langholtz et al., International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace 
Operations (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), 77. 
104 Chiyuki Aoi et al., “Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping,” Centre for International 
Political Studies, No. 56, 2007, 3. http://www.cips.up.ac.za/. 
 26
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 27
III. ASSESSMENT OF A KOREAN COMBAT BATTALION IN 
EAST TIMOR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, South Korea sent peacekeeping troops to East Timor at the request of the 
UN.  Korean involvement in peacekeeping missions began in 1993 when the Korean 
military was deployed to Somalia.  The deployment in East Timor is the first case in 
which combat troops were the bulk of the forces deployed.  Their activities started in 
October 1999 when they undertook missions in Lautem province.  The Republic of 
Korean Battalion (ROKBATT) moved to the Oecussi district after taking over from 
Jordanian forces in January 2002, and the PK mission finished in October 2003. 
During the deployment in East Timor, a total of 3,283 soldiers implemented 
missions that included policing operations, humanitarian assistance and friendship-
building activities, providing medical aid and preventive measures for infectious diseases, 
building infrastructure, operating Taekwondo classes and invitational events for residents.  
The “Saemaul Movement” in the village of Homé—a capacity-building program to 
encourage sustainability of local populations—received high interest and admiration from 
the United Nation Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), Non-
government Organizations (NGOs), and other forces.  Their diverse and enthusiastic 
activities earned the Korean forces a special nickname from the local people—“Malai 
Mutin,” meaning “the king of multinational forces.” 
Positive reports came from Korean pro-governmental media or relied on 
documents issued by governmental institutions and military reports, but these are not 
reliable assessments of the Korean forces’ long-term impact.  More objective evaluation 
is needed to precisely assess the Korean forces’ peacekeeping efforts in East Timor.  A 
long-term perspective needs to know whether ROKBATT activities were helpful for East 
Timor’s sustainable development.   
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To find out the scope and content of a mandate that can best assure successful 
peacekeeping, one must first examine the mandate from the troop-contributing 
government.  Then, one should look closely at the forces’ activities with regard to the 
mandate, and the results of their activities. 
This case study of Korean peacekeeping in East Timor begins with the historical 
background of conflict in East Timor and the participation process of Korean forces.  It 
then examines the Korean government’s mandate, including the clarity and specificity of 
the mandate’s scope and whether it contained the required elements for a contemporary 
peacekeeping mission.  Korean forces’ activities in accordance with their mandates are 
then examined, using several indicators of success.  Finally, an assessment of the overall 
success or failure of the Korean peacekeeping force with regard to the scope and content 
of its mandate is presented. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN EAST TIMOR 
East Timor is located in Southeast Asia on the east-southeast edge of Indonesia, 
north of Australia.  This small island has been cultivated by colonial powers, not by the 
Timorese. In the early 16th century, the island was colonized by the Portuguese.  The 
Portuguese struggled with the Dutch, who had colonized Indonesia.  The dispute between 
the two colonial powers resulted in an 1859 treaty in which the Portuguese yielded the 
western part of Timor Island.105  Japan occupied Timor from 1942 to 1945, but the 
Portuguese reasserted authority after the end of World War II.  East Timor remained one 
of several Portuguese colonial territories until 1974.  It was liberated from Portuguese 
colonial rule in 1975 as a result of the Revolution of Carnation in Portugal.106  The left-
wing Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) declared 
independence in November 1975 and was ready to build an independent state. 
                                                 
105 “The World Factbook: Timor-Leste,” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html. 
106 Ruth Wedgwood, East Timor and the United Nations, Paper prepared for the Columbia 
International Affairs Online Curriculum Modules, August 2001, 1. See also Yongho Choi, From East 
Timor to Timor-Leste (Seoul: Institution for Military History, 2006), 21. 
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Within ten days of the declaration of independence, the island was incorporated 
into Indonesia, becoming its 27th province in July 1976.  Notwithstanding dogged efforts 
by the Indonesian government, East Timor could not be combined into Indonesian 
society due to differences in historical background, culture and religion.107  Indonesia 
tried to stabilize the small island over three decades through brutal military repression 
that resulted in an estimated 100,000 causalities.108  The illegal occupation by Indonesia 
was condemned by the international community in several resolutions and annual votes 
by the UN General Assembly.109 
Tenacious strides of the Timorese toward independence led President Habibie of 
Indonesia to hold a referendum at the end of 1999.  With the advent of the post-Cold War 
era, human rights issues were emerging, and the 1991 massacre of pro-independence 
Timorese in the Santa Cruz cemetery again drew the attention of the international 
community.110 
Under supervision by the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the 
referendum for independence was held on August 30, 1999.  Although the vast majority 
of Timorese voted for independence from Indonesia, 111  the pro-Indonesia militia, 
supported by the Indonesian military (TNI), “commenced the wide-ranging, scorched-
earth campaign of retribution,” killing approximately 1,300 Timorese. 112  More than 
300,000 people were compulsorily relocated into West Timor as refugees.  Most of the 
physical infrastructure was destroyed, including roads, water supply systems, schools and 
hospitals. 
                                                 
107 Gichang Kwon, “Analysis on Military Operations of UN PKO in East Timor: Focusing on Soft 
Power of the ROK and Australian Forces” (MA diss., Seoul National University, 2007), 16. 
108 “The World Fact book: Timor-Leste,” 100,000 to 250,000 Timorese were killed by repression.  At 
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109 Joseph Nevins, “The Making of Ground Zero in East Timor in 1999: An Analysis of International 
Complicity in Indonesia’s Crimes,” Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 4, 627–628. 
110 In the Santa Cruz massacre, pro-independence Timorese were shot;  173 Timorese died, about 250 
people were missing, and more than 270 people were wounded. 
111 The data shows that 98.6 percent of the 451,792 eligible voters registered and cast their ballot, of 
which 78.5 percent favored independence. 
112 “Background Note: Timor-Leste,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35878.htm. 
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As the situation deteriorated, under pressure from the international community, 
the Indonesian government accepted a peacekeeping force on 12 September 1999.  
However, the UN needed time to organize and dispatch the peacekeeping forces.113  The 
deployment of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was permitted under 
Resolution 1264 of 15 September.114  The mandate, issued under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter, was called “one of the most strongly worded mandates ever given by the 
Security Council.”115 
Conflict in East Timor resulted in civilian casualties with large-scale displacement 
and suffering.  The peacekeeping missions in East Timor were different from Cold-War 
era conflicts.  The East Timor mission was “an important illustration of the shift from 
traditional peacekeeping to more complex and multifunctional peacekeeping and peace 
support operations.”116  It illustrates the need for “peace enforcement” to protect civilians 
and vulnerable people, and highlights the peacekeepers’ need to protect themselves from 
poorly identified and factionalized belligerents. 
C. KOREAN PARTICIPATION AND OBJECTIVES IN EAST TIMOR  
Following the UN’s decision to dispatch two brigade-sized multinational infantry 
forces for a limited time, Australia and the UN sounded out member countries about their 
willingness to participate in the mission.  South Korea also received an informal request 
from the UN and Australia to attend the PK mission.117 
It was difficult for the Korean government to agree to the troop request.  First, at 
the time, Korea and Indonesia maintained close economic cooperation, and the 
government did not want an uncomfortable relationship with Indonesia.  About 400 
                                                 
113 Yongho Choi, 53. 
114 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution (1999), S/RES/1264 (1999), September 15, 1999, 
http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm. 
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117 Dosaeng Jung, 147. 
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Korean enterprises had invested more than billion dollars in Indonesia.118  Indonesia was 
an important trade partner, supplying Korea with 70 percent of its liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and 4.5 percent of its oil.119  Furthermore, the Korean government had to consider 
the security of 20,000 Korean immigrants living in Indonesia.  In addition, since Korea 
did not have a standing force for the PK mission, it was unlikely to have prepared troops 
by the UN’s mid-September deadline.  Finally, and more importantly, because the UN 
had requested combat troops, the Korean government had to consider the threat to the 
lives of its soldiers.  The government was aware of the potential for Korean troops to 
collide with militia backed by the Indonesia armed forces (TNI).  For these reasons, 
South Korea was cautious about sending its troops to East Timor. 
However, Korean President Daejung Kim’s active support for East Timor at the 
summit conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) on 12 September, 
along with Indonesian President Habibie’s request for UN peacekeeping troops, changed 
the situation both within and outside of the Korean government.  The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs announced that "South Korea welcomed the decision of the Indonesia 
government," offering to “appropriately participate in the PK mission within its 
scope.”120 
President Kim’s will was a big factor in the decision.  Unlike the normal decision 
process for sending Korean troops abroad—when the UN requests, the Korean 
government makes a decision, and finally the government receives approval from the 
National Assembly—in this case, the Presidential decision came first, followed by the 
formal request from the UN and approval by the Korean National Assembly.  There was 
heated debate between the ruling People’s Party for New Politics and the opposition 
Grand National Party.  However, the government and ruling party were adamant about 
deploying Korean forces, claiming that participation in the PK mission in East Timor was 
a significant way to achieve the humanitarian foreign policy objectives of Kim’s 
                                                 
118 Yongho Choi, 106. 
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government.121  In reality, it was a means of highlighting Kim’s image as “Human Rights 
President Daejung Kim.”  After dispatching Korean troops to East Timor, President Kim 
received the Nobel Peace Prize.122 
Strong governmental pressure resulted in approval by the National Assembly on 
28 September 1999.  On 4 October 1999, the Korean PK force—named Sangnoksu 
(meaning “evergreen”)—left for East Timor to join the INTERFET.  As UNTAET was 
established,  ROKBATT changed its mission from MNF to PKO on 28 February 2000.123 
In the 1990s, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was eager to change its international 
reputation as a “receiving country” to a “giving country.”124  The government made 
several statements of the ROK’s desire to participate in UN activities, claiming a “legacy 
of historical experience” and “pay-back syndrome.”125  The PK mission in East Timor 
was perceived as an opportunity to change Korea’s role in regional security.  Japan could 
not send a combat force because the Japanese pacifist constitution limited its Self 
Defense Force (SDF) from deploying out of its territory.  The U.S. hesitated to send 
troops in the wake of the failure in Somalia and domestic criticism of over-deploying the 
military.126  The significance given by the ROK to peacekeeping in East Timor, therefore, 
is in accord with its developing self-concept as “a new middle power.” According to 
power transition theory, “a small power has limited geographical interests with its 
relative inability to influence political and military activities in the international system,” 
while a middle power’s support is an important factor in maintaining the international 
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status quo. 127   The ROK's participation in an Asian-based PK operation can be 
understood as part of an attempt to increase its status to a middle power country. 
The ROK’s desire to modify its status in the region could be facilitated by 
participation in world projects.  A report submitted by the committee of Unification and 
Foreign Affairs, after a review procedure in the National Assembly, cited the following 
objectives of Korean military participation in East Timor: “by contributing to regional 
peace and stability and by efforts for the improvement of democracy and human rights, 
we can enhance Korea’s status and image in the international community.”128 
In sum, Korea’s contribution to PK in East Timor can be understood as an attempt 
to change its image by expanding its role in regional security.  The Kim administration’s 
push to join Asian regional organizations was a step toward the ROK becoming a middle 
power, as was the decision to send the Korean military to East Timor.  At the same time, 
the ROK’s commitment to the security of Southeast Asia laid groundwork for a gradual 
expansion of South Korean economic influence in Asia.129  For the Korean government, 
diplomatic and economic interests preceded consideration of humanitarian assistance for 
East Timorese.  The Korean government’s long-term strategy of PK involvement served 
its own interest while coinciding with the long-term welfare of locals in East Timor. 
The South Korean Defense Ministry issued "Guidelines for Organization of 
ROKBATT to be Sent to East Timor" to Army Headquarters and the Special Warfare 
Command on 15 September 1999, two days after it tentatively decided to send troops to 
East Timor.  The formation of the forces originally followed the existing formation of a 
special force battalion, with some added combat support functions.   
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Considering the characteristics of the mission, Army Headquarters added combat 
equipment, such as armored vehicles, 81mm mortars and so forth.  Figure 1 shows the 
configuration of the troops. 
 
Figure 1.   The Composition of ROKBATT (Sangnoksu) to Deploy to East Timor (From: 
Choi, 2006)130 
Because the infantry force charged with policing activities was only 200 soldiers, 
the Sangnoksu force lacked troops in its security and civil-military activities, although it 
was responsible for controlling a broad area—1,702 square kilometers, 12 percent of the 
territory of East Timor.131  In comparison, the Filipino and Thai battalions, assigned 
control of similarly sized areas, each had 1,000 to 1,200 soldiers.132 
The Sangnoksu force completed its deployment to Los Palos, capital of Lautem 
Province, on 22 October 1999.  Before the ROKBATT arrived, much of Lautem had been 
burnt in revenge for the referendum vote against autonomy because the district was the 
center of Timorese resistance.133   Los Palos, Lautem’s capital, was the base of the 
                                                 
130 Yongho Choi, 121. 
131 Seungho Wui, “Study on the ROK Forces' Peacekeeping Operations in East Timor” (MA diss., 
Dankook University, 2006), 87. 
132 Ibid. 
133 East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, Profile of Lautem District March 2002, ed. Richard 
Simpson (Dili: East Timorese Public Administration, Lautem, 2002), 6. This document says that “all but 
two of the traditional houses were destroyed during the period of Indonesian occupation.” 
 35
“Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor” (FRETILIN) led by Xanana Gusmao, 
the current Prime Minister of Timor Leste. 
Oecussi district, where the ROKBATT moved after its operation in Lautem, also 
suffered badly after the referendum in 1999, with more than 90 percent of its buildings 
damaged. 134   It is an enclave region located within West Timor, a territory of 
Indonesia.135  Here, unlike in Lautem district, there were ever-present dangers that the 
TNI or pro-Indonesian militia might permeate the borders.  The 5th Contingent of the 
Sangnoksu force had to face such possibilities. 
D. THE KOREAN PEACEKEEPING MANDATE IN EAST TIMOR 
The UN issued Security Council Resolution 1272 on 25 October, 1999, 
establishing the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor to which 
INTERFET officially transferred its authority.  UNTAET had a much broader and more 
complex mission, containing broadly defined mandates to help East Timor sustain 
independence.136  The UNTAET mandate includes the following elements: 
a. To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory 
of East Timor;  
b. To establish an effective administration;  
c. To assist in the development of civil and social services;  
d. To ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
rehabilitation and development assistance;  
e. To support capacity-building for self-government;  
f. To assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable 
development.137 
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However, the mandate of UNTAET does not clearly specify the activities of 
military contingents stationed there.  With regards to the military operations and activities 
of the Korean force, PKFH issued several orders—particularly the military operational 
concept of “oil spot”138—but the Korean forces interpreted those as advisory rather than 
operational instructions.139  At the same time, the Korean Ministry of National Defense 
gave Order 99-4 which included guidelines for the overall operations and activities of 
ROKBATT in East Timor.  Order 99-4 consisted of the following elements: 
a. - Establishing friendly relations with the local population (“winning the 
hearts and minds”) 
- Implementing placatory activities to gain Timorese trust in Korean 
force activities 
- Providing as much food and medical assistance as possible 
- Trying actively to restore mutual trust between militia and residents 
b. - Maintaining security and order  
- Limiting activities of the militia by implementing show of force 
operations with armored vehicles 
- Patrolling and operating checkpoints and lookouts at major hot spots 
- Disarming and demobilizing the militia 
c. - Using force only to protect themselves in response to attack (guideline 
with respect to self-defense) 
- Following general self-defense guidelines of the UN 
- Not carrying out pre-emptive strikes 
- Not harming the adversary when there is no damage, even in cases of 
assault 
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- Refraining from use of arms under any circumstances, as much as 
possible.140 
The scope of the mandates from the Korean government is clear and specific.  
Order 99-4 explicitly describes the key concept of Korean force activity as “establishing 
friendly relations with the local population,” so there is little room for misinterpretation.  
It gives especially detailed instructions regarding the sphere of “security activity.”  The 
order describes what the Korean force had to do in policing activity—such as patrols, 
operating checkpoints and lookouts, etc. 
With regard to civil-military activity, although Order 99-4 mentioned a general 
direction—the key concept mentioned above, “establishing friendly relations with local 
population”—there is little mention of specific activities except for comments about 
providing food and medical assistance.  Due to the lack of specific directions, the Korean 
force had to contrive implied tasks based on provisions calling for them to gain the trust 
of locals and to restore mutual trust between militias and residents.  In reality, each 
contingent of the Korean forces applied unique and creative ways of implementing the 
broadly-defined mandate for civil-military activity. 
Contrary to expert recommendations for the content of contemporary mission 
mandates (as discussed above), the order issued by the Korean government strongly 
restricts the use of force.141  Another difference between the Korean government’s order 
and the required contents that most scholars call for is no mention of sustainable 
development of the post-conflict society. 
In sum, the mandate ordered by the Korean government for their forces deployed 
to East Timor is clear and specific overall.  However, it is more clearly defined in 
security activity and less specifically defined in civil-military activity.  With respect to 
the content of the mandate, the government order does not contain the required elements 
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of current peacekeeping missions, such as use of force and consideration of sustainable 
development of a post-conflict society. 
E. ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN EAST TIMOR 
1. Maintaining Security and Order 
It is hard to categorize all activities of the Korean forces in accordance with the 
mandate regarding security operations.  However, when Korean forces activities 
associated with maintaining law and order are put together, they can be divided as shown 
in Table 2. 
Mandate Activities 
1. Limiting militia’s activities  
by patrols 
- Regularly patrolling roads and residential 
areas 
- Patrolling countryside with armed vehicles 
2. Operating checkpoints 
and lookouts 
- Providing security for diverse facilities 
- Managing the Junction Point  
3. Disarming and 
demobilizing militia 
- Seizing guns and ammunition 
- Collecting arms by resident report 
4. Friendship-building through 
pacifying psychological warfare 
(implied by other clauses) 
- Releasing militia families  
and helping them to return home 
- Participating in the family events of residents 
Table 2. Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor 
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu forces, 2000–2003) 
With respect to activities surrounding security Mandate 1, the Korean force 
implemented regular patrols of main roads and residential areas.  In Lautem province, 
ROKBATT patrolled roads and residential areas three times a day and its armored 
vehicles patrolled the four regions on alternate days to police the countryside of Los 
Palos.142  At Oecussi, dividing the district into two sub-regions, the ROKBATT carried 
out policing operations by stationing combat companies in each sub-region.  
Following security Mandate 2, ROKBATT provided security for the diverse 
facilities of the UN, public institutions like hospitals, and a refugee camp.  At Oecussi, 
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the ROKBATT also managed the Junction Point (JP) along the border.  While operating 
five observation posts and patrolling the border, an operation similar to that executed in 
the Korean Demilitarized Zone, the Sangnoksu force also guarded returning refugees.143 
There seemed to be somewhat less active involvement of Korean forces under 
Security Mandate 3.  As soon as the Korean force arrived at Lautem, it seized 420 illegal 
guns and 5,000 rounds of ammunition.144  This was the only case in which the Sangnoksu 
force actively followed Mandate 3.  The Korean forces did not take active measures 
regarding disarming and demilitarization, and seemed unprepared to implement those 
tasks.  No training for such operations was done during the preparation period or in 
training during deployment.  Rather than trying to forcibly disarm combatants, the 
Korean force followed another command concept in Order 99-4—winning the hearts and 
minds of residents.  That is, the Sangnoksu force followed the general direction of 
activities mandated in the Korean government order even though Order 99-4 did not 
explicitly order it as a realm of security operation.  Nevertheless, the ROKBATT 
collected many arms caches based upon residents’ reports.  The 2nd Contingent collected 
more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition and grenades based on voluntary reports by the 
Timorese.145 
The Koreans focused on disarming tasks were influenced by another specific 
mandate—minimizing use of arms under any circumstances.  ROKBATT was concerned 
about disputes in the process of disarmament and avoided them, as demonstrated by the 
fact that the 1st Contingent did not try to seize the air guns that many residents owned 
even though the force recognized air guns as a potential security threat. 146  However, the 
Sangnoksu force encouraged people to register the air guns and then put them under the 
control of village chiefs. 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 187 
144 Ministry of National Defense, “Participation and Outcomes of Peacekeeping in East Timor,” 
Defense Report, No. 126, April, 2001. 
145 Youngho Song, The 2nd Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force (Seoul: 
Joint Staff College, 2001), 59. 
146 Inchul Park, The 1st Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Sangnoksu force (Seoul: Joint 
Staff College, 2000), 51. 
 40
Meanwhile, with respect to security Mandate 4, in accordance with provisions for 
“restoring mutual trust between militia and residents” and “implementing placatory 
activities,” the Korean force tried to minimize all disputes, even minor ones in its Areas 
of Responsibility (AOR).  It released militias and their families interned by Lautem 
residents and helped those who had taken shelter in the Los Palos church return to their 
homes.147  The Sangnoksu force held sports matches to promote harmony and goodwill 
among residents.  Sometimes it combined policing activities with friendship-building 
efforts by participating in local family events like weddings and funerals.148  To ease the 
anxiety of Tutuala residents about Indonesian fishing boats near Tutuala beach, 
ROKBATT stationed troops at the beach for two months.  This was not the security 
mission originally described in the policing operation plan, but the task met residents’ 
demands.  The Korean force also organized a citizen report system to deal with problems 
in the daily lives of local people.149 
The Sangnoksu force tried to minimize disputes among residents in its AOR.  
Through its information-gathering activities, each Korean contingent collected and 
evaluated information regarding the security risk presented by potentially threatening 
persons, mainly pre-militia members, among residents.150  Additionally, ROK forces 
actively sought to minimize potential conflict between malcontents and other residents by 
periodically patrolling areas of concern and conducting friendship-building activities like 
soccer matches.  For instance, in August 2001, the Sangnoksu force held a volleyball and 
soccer match for “the unity and harmony of local residents,” a match in which more than 
1,000 people participated.151 
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The Korean force also mediated the border dispute between Oecussi and West 
Timor.  Due to the differing claims of TNI, PKF Headquarters and local people, the 
borderline had not been confirmed.  To solve this problem, the Sangnoksu force 
thoroughly searched the whole area near the border to find beacon poles installed by the 
TNI several decades earlier.  They eventually found 150 beacon poles and encouraged the 
parties to sign an agreement based on the locations of the poles.152  The force also made 
unremitting efforts to keep amicable relations with the TNI through regularly coordinated 
meetings, friendship activities, and joint patrols.153 
In summary, ROKBATT mainly followed the mandate of its government to 
maintain security and order.  On the whole, it tried to keep to the specific mandates 
elucidated in Order 99-4.  However, in addition to fulfilling specified mandates for 
security operations, the Korean force added to its security missions through friendship-
building with local people and creating a peaceful atmosphere.  It avoided rigid policing 
under military principles.  Importantly, the Sangnoksu force was influenced by the 
mandate to refrain from use of force as well as the general code of conduct, both 
specified in Order 99-4. 
2. Civil-Military Activities 
Each unit, from the 1st to the 8th Contingent, employed continuing and creative 
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- Security maintenance 
- Support for the return of internally displaced people 
- Orphan invitation event and visits to asylums 
- Humanitarian relief: medical aid, haircutting 
2nd 
Contingent 
- Strengthened coordinating system with UN organizations 
and NGO 
- Taekwondo education and Saemaul movement 
- Humanitarian relief (continued) 
3rd 
Contingent 
- Reconstruction of basic social facilities: roads, bridges, etc. 
- Humanitarian relief : medical aid, service to the local community 
- Blue Angel Operation 
4th 
Contingent 
- Various events with the locals populace (movies, sports games) 
- Blue Angel Operation (continued) 








- Conclusion of mission in Lautem 
- Establishment of Korean operations in Oecussi 
- Multi-functional humanitarian relief thru Blue Angel Operation 
6th 
Contingent 
- Enhancement of friendship with the local populace 
- Blue Jean Operation: return of military uniforms 
- Oecussi mini-World Cup 
7th 
Contingent 
- Young people support: Golden-bell challenge 
- Walking national territory with the local populace 
- Blue Angel Operation (continued) 
- Capacity-building education: equipment handling, tune-up 
8th 
Contingent 
- Humanitarian aid and capacity-building education 
- Taekwondo and soccer education and cultural activities 
- Preparation for the return to home 
Table 3. Civil-Military Operations and Activities of the ROKBATT in East 
Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu forces, 2000–2003) 
Order 99-4 definitely mentioned only medical assistance and humanitarian relief 
in the category of civil-military activities.  Following Order 99-4, ROKBATT set up a 
sketchy concept of civil-military activities focused on humanitarian relief, friendship-
building, and capacity-building.  ROKBATT used some activities to help the local 
population gain ownership in reconstructing their society and fostering self-reliance, but 
limitations arose in maintaining continuity and in ROKBATT’s ability.   
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The follow-on contingents did not continue the activities of the previous contingents.  
Korean force civil-military activities can be divided in the following manner. 
Mandate Activities 
1. Humanitarian relief 
- Medical assistance 
- Infrastructure reconstruction 
- Providing relief goods 
- Blue Angel Operation 
2. Friendship-building 
- Taekwondo education 
- Religious activity support  
- Cultural exchange activities 
- Orphan invitations 
- Haircut service 
- Blue Angel Operation 
3. Capacity-building 
- Saemaul movement 
- School facility remodeling 
- Language classes 
- Computer class 
Table 4. Civil-Military Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East 
Timor (From: Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu forces, 2000–2003) 
Civil-military Mandate 1 is the specified mission.  Civil-military Mandate 2 is the 
implied mission.  Civil-military Mandate 3 is deduced by examining Sangnoksu force 
activities.   
a. Activities by Mandate 1: Humanitarian Relief 
The Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations defines 
“humanitarian assistance” as follows: 
Humanitarian assistance mainly stands for emergency, life-saving 
assistance, providing such as adequate food, water, health care.  And it 
includes “enabling” programs like clearing mines, providing physical 
security and building or reviving institutions.  
“Humanitarian assistance”—short-term and emergency needs—and 
“development assistance”—long-term economic and social support—
should be divided, but these areas overlap.  Ideologically, the 
humanitarian assistance should no longer be needed after a peace accord, 
but in reality, humanitarian crisis goes on for a very long time so that the 
humanitarian assistance is frequently required assisting in recovery and 
reconstruction.  Thus, resuscitating a health care system or supporting 
local efforts to revive elementary school teaching is often comprised in 
this “humanitarian assistance.”154 
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Korean forces provided emergency life-saving assistance with health care 
and relief goods and provided an enabling program by building infrastructure and helping 
in flood recovery.  Providing medical aid was a major civil-military activity of the 
Korean force.  Each contingent was continuously employed, following the specified 
mandate.  The medical corps of the ROKBATT operated a mobile medical clinic from 
village to village in the Lautem area.  At Ocecussi, stationed clinics were set up by two 
company posts.  According to Contingent Homecoming Reports, each medical corps of 
the Sangnoksu force treated an average of 100 to 150 patients per day.  The Sangnoksu 
force distributed many relief goods to the Timorese compared with Portuguese and Thai 
forces. 155  With the support of several Korean firms, Korean forces delivered daily 
necessities, clothes, and even children’s toys to local people.156  The 6th Contingent 
conducted a “blue jeans” operation in which residents' military uniforms could be 
exchanged for jeans supplied by a Korean company.157 
There have been extensive debates on the military's role in rebuilding 
social infrastructure in post-conflict societies.  Some say that NGOs should cope with 
such activities because they can respond more quickly to disasters and have neutral 
intentions. 158   Others argue that the military should participate in infrastructure 
reconstruction where rapid recovery is required, like repairing roads and hospitals,159 
because peacekeeping forces already in place can undertake reconstruction activities 
quickly and efficiently.160   
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The Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations notes that building 
infrastructure and helping in recovery after floods must be regarded as an appropriate 
military-contingent task in a humanitarian mission if it is an “enabling condition for a 
functioning peacetime society.”161 
Although not a designated mission according to civil-military Mandate 1, 
as an enabling program in humanitarian assistance, the engineering corps of the 
Sangnoksu force completed several projects and actively participated in flood recovery.  
Three bridges were constructed or repaired by ROKBATT at Iliomar and Los Palos.162  
The Tumin Graveyard, a holy place long cherished by local people, was repaired in 
Oecussi.163  Additionally, irrigation canals were constructed on the Tono river, enabling 
triple cropping for a year at 5,000 hectare of rice per paddy.164  When Lautem was hit by 
flash floods in 2000 and 2001, Korean military contingents assisted recovery activities, 
rescuing isolated people and providing emergency facilities for the homeless.  It 
evacuated 200 Timorese trapped by a landslide, provided aid to flood victims,165 and 
built an alternative road between Baucau and Los Palos.166  The Korean forces also 
repaired damaged institutions quickly by transporting necessary material from Korea. 
b. Activities by Mandate 2: Friendship-Building 
Friendship-building was not specified as a civil-military activity within the 
official mandate.  However, it was specified as a general direction of all Korean force 
activities in East Timor.  Developing good relationships with the local population helps 
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“alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief communities.”167  In order to gain the 
confidence and cooperation of the local population, the Sangnoksu force implemented a 
variety of friendship activities. 
The most nationally characteristic ROKBATT activity was holding 
Taekwondo classes.  The Taekwondo classes were meant to propagate Korean culture to 
the Timorese through physical and mental training while building a positive relationship 
with the local people.168  Taekwondo education was continuously employed throughout 
most contingents, as shown in the Table 5.  The Sangnoksu force even dispatched 
Taekwondo instructors to the East Timor Military Academy to teach cadets at the 
Academy’s request.169 
 
Division 1st unit 2nd unit 3rd unit 4th unit 5th unit 6th unit 7th unit 8th unit
Participants - 250 1,100 1,062 2,029 1,204 540 323 
Table 5. Participants in Taekwondo Classes in East Timor (From: 
Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu Units, 2000–2003) 
The Sangnoksu force held a monthly orphan invitation event for children 
who had lost their parents during the war and brought comfort packages to facilities for 
the underprivileged and disadvantaged every month.  It also provided haircut services.  
For instance, the 4th Contingent offered a haircut service for three months to about 1,000 
residents in eight different towns.170  The haircut service allowed Korean soldiers to 
collect information about local disputes and friction.171 
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ROKBATT was also interested in supporting religious activity.  Ninety 
percent of Timorese are Catholic.  Most chaplain officers of the Sangnoksu force 
deployed from Korea were Catholic priests, and they were actively involved in religious 
support activities.172  By holding religious services with local Timorese, the Korean 
troops tried to win the minds of the local people.  Father Lim Sung-ho was invited from 
Korea, and a chapel in the Sepelata region was reconstructed during his visit.173 
The Sangnoksu force used traditional performances and folk plays of both 
countries to promote intercultural awareness.  ROKBATT integrated with cultural events 
such entertainment as music by an Oecussi band and dancing.  On the occasion of the 
Football World Cup in Korea and Japan, ROKBATT, with the Japanese Engineer Group 
(JEG), organized a soccer competition for improving its relationship with locals and for 
promoting harmony among local populations.174 
The Blue Angel Operation was a comprehensive civil-military operation 
uniting all activities related to humanitarian assistance and friendship-building.  Some 
civil-military activities with modest beginnings in the early stages of reconstruction 
developed into the Blue Angel Operation as time went on.  Initiated by the 3rd 
Contingent, this monthly event made the rounds from village to village, providing 
medical aid, barber service, donation and repair of farming equipment, etc.  Friendship-
building activities included many cultural and sports exchange events with performances 
of local songs and dances as well as traditional Korean Samul-nori percussion music.  
During a garrison tour, Korean soldiers showed pictures and video clips about 
ROKBATT’s activities to enhance the trust of the local community. 
c. Activities for Capacity Building  
There was no specific mandate for capacity-building in Order 99-4 despite 
several clauses associating the mission with the UNTAET mandates for development 
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assistance, capacity-building, and establishing conditions for sustainable development.  
Furthermore, there was no consideration of sustainable development in the Korean 
mandate.  However, examining all activities by the Korean peacekeeping contingents 
shows that several involve capacity-building. 
For example, ROKBATT participated in several activities to improve the 
educational environment and create an academic atmosphere.  The 1st Contingent taught 
English to 2,160 students. 175   The 4th Contingent taught 55 high school students 
computer usage,176 the 5th Contingent operated a Korean class three times a week.177  
Contingents 6 through 8 provided scholarships to poor and orphaned students every 
month.178  The Sangnoksu force repaired schools damaged by violence, built classrooms, 
installed chalkboards, and provided classroom materials.  Additionally, the Korean 
contingent along with the United States Support Group East Timor (USGET) repaired 
several schools damaged by riots. 179   In post-conflict reconstruction, helping a 
community repair its educational facilities is necessary because “new or refurbished 
schools send a powerful signal that the times have changed.”180 
To help the Timorese recognize the value of their nation’s territory, the 
ROKBATT designed and held an “Around Oecussi Field Trip” in which students (one 
from each of the district’s schools), teachers and NGOs participated.181   
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“Ring the Golden Bell,” a series of quiz competitions, was organized by the Korean force, 
according to one Korean officer, “to create in Timorese students an enthusiasm for 
learning.”182  
Korean peacekeepers from the 2nd through the 4th Contingents undertook 
a project to encourage sustainable development.  The Saemaul Undong project (Korean 
for “movement to build a new village”) was a Korean government model for rural 
development used throughout the 1970s and 1980s.183  The movement in Korea had 
several positive outcomes, including rural modernization and improved crop 
diversification and productivity.184  Applying the ideas of Saemaul Undong in the Homé 
village began with the Korean 2nd Contingent.185  Following on their efforts, the 3rd 
Contingent also established a bond with the Homé village.  Military officers from the two 
contingents planned the project in conjunction with the Korea Saemaul Undong Center 
and Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute before deploying to East Timor.  
However, an officer from the 2nd Contingent says, “It was difficult to lead the 
participation of the local people and to show visible performance within such a short 
period of time.”186  The 4th Contingent renamed the movement the “Homé Community 
Project” and undertook various programs including digging and maintaining wells and 
education in organic farming techniques.  With income-generating businesses supported 
by the Korean force, like fish farming, the Homé project in this stage seemed more 
successful, with increased local participation and a more positive response.  During this 
phase, seven public wells were dug, a poultry farming facility was constructed, and joint 
funding for the village was raised.  Village residents repaired the Homé elementary 
school with the proceeds from crop sales and help from the Sangnoksu engineering 
corps.187  This project was greatly admired by UNTAET, NGOs and other countries’ 
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forces.188  Executive officers and agriculture officers of the UNTAET visited the Homé 
village and the Civil-Military Affairs Commissioner of the PKF in UNTAET directed 
public release of a campaign on a national scale.189 
F. ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN EAST 
TIMOR 
1. Assessment of Korean Force Security Activities 
Maintaining law and order was supposed to be the most important task for the 
Korean force in implementing its peacekeeping mission.  Establishing “a secure 
environment” by providing security is vital because it generates “the conditions for other 
political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities,” as the US military’s 
Field Manual 3-07.31 Peace Ops emphasizes.190  In other words, in order to create a new 
chance for reconstruction in a war-torn society, “reestablishment of a secure environment” 
is critical.191  Therefore, a successful security operation was a keystone of success not 
only for the Korean peacekeeping operation but also for the overall peace operation in 
East Timor. 
In this part of the assessment of ROKBATT’s security operation, the outcome of 
its activities is defined chiefly by the following factors: crime rates, a perception of 
security and the rule of law, and peacekeeper casualties.192  Prior to the deployment of 
the Korean forces, security concerns in Lautem were serious.  According to the UNTAET 
report on trials for crimes committed in 1999, most of the crimes that occurred during 
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pre- and post-ballot violence—between April and September 1999—took place in the 
Lautem area.193  Also, violent murders of clergy and lay people in Los Palos were 
reported in Lautem on September 25, just before Korean troops arrived.194 
However, this challenging security situation in Lautem district gradually 
improved with the deployment of Korean forces.  Empirical evidence supports the 
conclusion that the security situation in Lautem stabilized rather quickly following the 
arrival of Korean peacekeeping forces.  The civilian police report crimes committed in 
East Timor in 2000 states that only 116 crimes occurred in Lautem, which was 4.4 
percent of the total 2,636 crimes committed in East Timor in 2000.195  This is a fairly low 
crime rate considering that Lautem includes more than 6 percent of the total Timorese 
population.196  Reducing crime is very important in a post-conflict society because “it 
contributes heavily to building higher levels of generalized trust.”197  A decrease in level 
of crime prompts optimism within the society.198 
In addition, the fact that the East Timor Court sentenced ten pro-Indonesian 
militiamen to imprisonment in the first conviction for past violence also signaled an 
enhanced security situation in Lautem.199  If the lingering threat posed by pro-Indonesian 
militias had been deemed serious in Lautem, the adjudication might have been tempered 
out of fear of retaliation.  On 3 April 2003, Lautem became the first place where the UN 
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turned over police duties to local authorities.  The UN announced, “Lautem is the first to 
be granted such complete security and law enforcement authority by UNMISET.”200 
Lastly, it is undeniable that the high rate of voter registration, 99.3 percent in the 
2001 national election in Lautem, was facilitated by the stable environment.  The ROK 
contingents put forth much effort to facilitate the 2001 vote by minimizing security risks 
with checkpoints, night patrols near the ballot-counting locations, and other security-
related efforts.201  According to a national survey of voter knowledge, Lautem residents 
were somewhat positively aware of the security situation in their residential area.202  
Relatively speaking, the problem of violence was not a particular concern in the Lautem 
district. 
These results demonstrate that the policing efforts by the Sangnoksu force 
improved the security situation in Lautem district.  Of course, it is hard to say that 
changes in the security environment were due only to activities of the Korean forces.  
There were many actors involved, including the UN police.  Many complained about the 
operations of the UN police in East Timor in regard to residential crimes.203  The same 
was true in Lautem.  In Los Palos, residents complained that gangs of youths prowled at 
night, intimidating people, throwing stones, breaking into houses, and killing domestic 
animals.  They alleged that “police were unwilling or unable to control this.” 204  
However, Lautem district was the least criminalized area, as shown by the above-
mentioned corroborating figures.  It is clear that, in concert with other contingents of the 
UN, the Korean force contributed to a reduction in violence with its security operation. 
In fact, the Korean forces had a fundamental limitation on their policing activities 
due to the fact that no more than 200 infantry soldiers were responsible for a large 
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territory.  The ROKBATT’s activities to maintain security and order were augmented 
considerably by building friendships with local populations and creating a peaceful 
atmosphere, in addition to implementing the policing operation specifically mandated in 
Order 99-4.  The effectiveness of the Korean security activities seemed to work.  That is 
to say, ROKBATT’s attempts to create a friendly relationship with the local population 
helped to improve the security situation in the districts in which it deployed. 
2. Assessment of Korean Force Civil-Military Activities 
a. Assessment of Activities for Humanitarian Relief  
Humanitarian relief involves short-term activities that focus on “providing 
goods and services to minimize immediate risks to human health and survival.”205  In 
peace operations, this mission is usually assigned to UN relief agencies, donors and 
NGOs.  However, in accordance with the specific mandate by the Korean government, 
the Sangnoksu force actively participated in this humanitarian relief mission with some 
support in the form of relief goods sent by the Korean government and Korean firms. 
There have been many discussions about how to measure and analyze the 
impact of humanitarian assistance by international agencies.  Three main approaches are 
generally argued: a scientific approach, a deductive or inductive approach, and 
participatory approaches. 206   However, since “relief interventions are often of short 
duration capacity and resources are stretched,” many scholars say that it is hard to 
translate activities of humanitarian relief into measurable indicators which show clear 
improvements in the analysis of impact.207  This is even more the case in humanitarian 
relief efforts by a military contingent, given its limited deployment duration in a post-
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conflict area.  The Korean force was stationed less than two years at each location, and its 
relief goods were considerably limited because it was not the principal agent in the 
humanitarian mission. (Nonetheless, the amount of relief goods supported by the Korean 
government and firms was the envy of the other military contingents.)  Therefore, rather 
than scientific or quantitative impact indicators, contextual information—information 
spread via word of mouth—may be used to evaluate humanitarian relief.  That is, what 
was said about Korean force humanitarian assistance and what kinds of changes in the 
health sector appeared in the stationed regions can help gauge the effectiveness of Korean 
humanitarian activity. 
ROKBATT medical teams likely gave high priority to treating as many 
patients as possible, as shown in Table 6.  Given the poor working environment and the 
lack of army doctors in ROKBATT—only three military doctors in each contingent—the 
number of Timorese patients to which the medical team offered medical treatment is a 
marvel.  Its performance records show a significant difference compared with the medical 
teams of other countries.208  The medical chief of the Australia force raised objections to 
the big difference in the number of patients treated by the two countries.209  However, the 
difference was due to the perspective gap between the Australians, who gave weight to 
capacity-building through teaching medical skills, and the Koreans, who wanted to treat a 
large number of patients for humanitarian reasons.  Since humanitarian relief is a short-
term activity, the Korean force’s strategy of trying to cope with many patients is 
understandable. 
Division 1st unit 2nd unit 3rd unit 4th unit 5th unit 6th unit 7th unit 8th unit
Participants - 150 per day 10,319 4,266 5,942 3,651 4,629 3,009 
Table 6. Number of Timorese Patients Treated by Each Contingent (From: 
Homecoming Reports of the Sangnoksu Units, 2000–2003) 
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Given the dismal health sector situation in Lautem after the violence 
following the referendum—“all ten health posts were destroyed, Los Palos hospital was 
looted and damaged”210—the Korean force medical team attached great importance to 
treating many patients.  Lautem district was one of the most severely affected areas in 
terms of resident health problems.  Due to the prolonged wet season, the disease 
transmission season in Lautem is longer than in any other part of East Timor.211  A report 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) in January 2001 shows that Lautem reports the 
highest number of cases of endemic diseases212—especially diarrhea, upper and lower 
respiratory infections, and malaria—all of which are regarded as significant health 
problems in a developing society.  To respond, the Sangnoksu force put every effort into 
taking care of as many patients as possible.  This is a positive step toward a better future 
for many people in need. 
It is said that preventing a rise in mortality rates is often the first objective 
of humanitarian assistance.213  Changes in the infant mortality rate in Lautem district 
reveal much about the humanitarian relief mission.  The infant mortality rate in Lautem 
decreased by 10.4 percent, from a rate of 115.8 percent in 1996 to 105.4 percent in 
2002.214  Census data in 2004 record that three sub-districts in Lautem—Los Palos, 
Lautem, Luro—saw the most rapid decline in infant mortality.215  While “mortality is an 
extremely late indicator” 216—that is, estimating mortality is not suitable in emergency 
assessment217—the positive figure regarding the health sector indirectly show that, to 
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some extent, the medical activities of the Sangnoksu force contributed to the 
humanitarian assistance sector within the overall peace operation in East Timor. 
With only 18 members, including three military doctors, the Korean 
medical corps faced some limitations, especially in coping with tropical diseases.  
Lautem had the highest incidence of malaria and Oecussi had relatively high levels.218  
One Homecoming Report mentions the absence of a medical specialist trained in this 
category of diseases.  The Korean forces had to seek the help of the United States 
Support Group East Timor (USGET) to cope with malaria.219 
Medical activities by the Korean force were very well received by 
Timorese residents.  One emergency case received a very positive response by the local 
community, when a Korean medical team saved the lives of two pregnant women by 
driving six hours round-trip in inclement weather.220  The cooperative health services 
provided by Medicos Do Mundo Portugal (MDMP) and the ROKBATT were accepted as 
the main health services agency in Lautem.221 
The Blue Angel Operation to support those whose homes were inundated 
by big floods in 2001 had a positive reputation among the local people.  Through this 
civil-military operation, ROKBATT provided relief goods, medical aid, and more.222  
These humanitarian activities by the Korean force were spotlighted by UN PKF 
Headquarters as successful cases of civil-military activity.223 
With respect to infrastructure reconstruction, the Korean forces' 
involvement in flood recovery deserves positive evaluation.  The Korean peacekeeping 
force made great efforts to offer humanitarian assistance in a difficult situation.  
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Participating actively in many recovery constructions efforts and demonstrating a 
superior work rate, the engineering unit of the Sangnoksu force was favorably spotlighted, 
compared with less capable Pakistani and Bangladesh engineering units.224 
In truth, the Korean force was inadequate, poorly equipped and had 
limited capabilities for such tasks.  The Sangnoksu force was sent on a “peace 
enforcement” mission rather than a “peace-building” mission when it first deployed.  
Thus, ROKBATT consisted chiefly of infantry.  It had only one engineering company 
comprised of 46 soldiers.  Furthermore, some equipment was not appropriate for 
construction activities in post-conflict East Timor.  One Homecoming Report points to 
the need for multifunctional compact construction equipment rather than military 
engineering equipment.225  On the one hand, some of infrastructure building activities 
were hardly to be regarded as enabling program in the aspect of humanitarian assistance, 
especially building a horse racetrack in Oecussi by the 6th contingent.  There has been 
little necessity to use the force’s precious assets and efforts to construct such a facility. 
In summary, the specific mandated humanitarian activities were relatively 
successful.  Although the medical team had limited capability for handling some tropical 
diseases, it helped lessen severe health conditions during the initial post-conflict period.  
However, with regard to unmandated tasks—especially rebuilding infrastructure—it is 
hard to say that the forces were successful.  The Sangnoksu force played a limited role in 
post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction due to its lack of personnel and equipment. 
b. Assessment of Friendship-Building Activity  
The Sangnoksu force conducted diverse civil-military activities in 
friendship-building and cross-cultural understanding.  Occasional one-time events were 
held by each contingent to invigorate communication and foster informal relationships 
with the local population. 
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Increasing the closeness and cross-cultural awareness between intervener 
and recipient is recognized as an important factor in a peace operation.  Several scholars 
argue that a positive relationship with the local population is decisive for a successful 
mission.226  Whalan claims that the power of a peace operation is dependent on the 
recognition achieved by local actors.227  Others note that sustainable development of a 
local society is possible only when harmony with the local population accompanies the 
operational and tactical aspects of the peace operation.228   Even though friendship-
building activities and a solid connection with local cultures seem critical to the success 
of peace operations, an empirical link has not yet been clearly presented.229  Therefore, 
narrative resources which describe the locals’ perception of the Korean force and local 
cooperation with Korean force activities are used as indicators. 
With vigorous efforts by all contingents of the Korean force to teach 
Taekwondo, the popularity of the sport boomed, not just in Lautem and Oecussi. 
Taekwondo became popular throughout East Timor, and the national East Timor 
Taekwondo championship was among the Independence Day events in May 2002.  
Taekwondo classes were held to propagate Korean culture through physical and mental 
training and to build positive relationships. 230  A UNTAET headquarters spokesman 
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How can human beings connect even without the lack of a common 
language?  The children barely know a word of Korean.  Their taekwondo 
teacher has nothing more than a bare-bones understanding of Tetum and 
Bahasa Indonesia.  Yet both sides have broken the language barrier.  
Outside the classroom, a soldier and a young Timorese are engaged in an 
animated conversation.  There is that familiar hodge-podge of words and 
gestures.  Suddenly both explode in laughter.  “When you talk to friends, 
maybe you don't need the same words.”231 
Taekwondo became a regular subject at the Timorese Military Academy, 
and many Timorese martial art experts fostered by ROKBATT became Taekwondo 
instructors.  Taekwondo is now one of the sports programs aimed at reducing violence 
among street gangs, with 700 young children from East Timor participating.232   
There were no reports of disputes between Korean soldiers and local 
populations in incident data from the headquarters of the PKF.  This was not true for 
other countries’ forces.  There were gender incidents involving local women and 
Jordanian forces.233  Furthermore, Timorese residents showed a cooperative attitude in 
several friendship-building events when local bands played and people performed their 
traditional dance, Tebe-Tebe.  Residents in Luro invited the Sangnoksu force to a play 
performed by 40 Timorese students as a token of gratitude for the Koreans’ enthusiastic 
local activities. 234   The fact that residents voluntarily reported concealed arms and 
ammunition also demonstrates the extent to which the Sangnoksu force succeeded in 
winning the support of locals. 
There is other evidence of successful friendship-building.  The East Timor 
news reported that the Sangnoksu force received big applause from local residents and 
those in the Laga region cheered, “Viva Korea!” for the Korean forces’ civil-military 
activities.235  The Timorese Prime Minister eulogized Korean force activities, saying that 
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“ROKBATT played a very visible and positive role.”236  The Lautem local government 
named a street in downtown Los Palos “Lua Maluk Korea” (Friend Korea Street237) 
while Oecussi residents built a memorial park to commemorate five Korean peacekeepers 
who died on PKF duty.238 
Such friendship-building activities are acknowledged as significant for 
preventing the recurrence of conflict and avoiding disputes between peacekeepers and 
recipients. 239  As noted above, the districts where the Korean forces were deployed 
recorded a relatively low residential crime rate, and there were few disputes between 
Korean peacekeeping soldiers and locals.  Activities aimed at friendship-building helped 
peacekeepers and recipients overcome cultural and ethnic differences.  Overall, 
ROKBATT’s activities for friendship-building and cross-cultural understanding, which 
were mandated as a general guideline for all its activities and its code of conduct, worked 
successfully. 
c. Assessment of Capacity-Building Activity 
In a peacekeeping operation, capacity-building activities are related to 
development assistance—“long-term economic and social support.”240   Homecoming 
Reports say the Korean force implemented activities to help the educational environment 
and the Saemaul Undong project for capacity-building.   
Capacity-building helps local people to “increase their capacity to meet 
their community’s needs [and] engage new opportunities.”241  The development strategy 
of the intervener is to fulfill the local people’s needs and offer them new chances to 
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develop their community.  There can be no sustainable peace without development in 
post-conflict situations.  The World Bank emphasizes local ownership and indigenous 
capacities with respect to capacity-building and sustainable development in a post-
conflict society.242  That is, capacity-building is meant to help people and communities 
manage change themselves over many years following the conflict.  
To evaluate the capacity-building activities of the Korean force, two 
critical concepts of post conflict development are utilized, ownership and 
sustainability.243  Capacity-building activities are assessed to see if they helped the locals 
gain local ownership, whether the activities were continued by the next contingent and 
lasted when the force left, and whether the activities had a long-term impact on social 
development. 
The Sangnoksu force’s education activities were not conducted 
continuously by all contingents.  When each contingent was relieved of duty every six 
months, most education activities were not handed over.  Education activities tended to 
be one-time events, and some were unnecessary or did not meet a community need.  
According to 2004 census data, both Lautem and Oecussi had a relatively rates of 
illiteracy rate, over 60 percent compared with a national average of 54 percent.244  More 
importantly, Lautem and Oecussi residents had the least ability to use the official 
languages, Tetum and Portuguese.  In these districts, more people used Indonesian and 
local languages than the official languages.245  Using an official language is significant, 
especially in a post-conflict society, because it is an important means for people to gain a 
sense of national unity and social integration.246  Also, the official language can become 
                                                 
242 Andrew McGregor, “Development, Foreign Aid and Post-Development in Timor-Leste,” Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2007, 155. 
243 W. Lambourne, et al. “Peacebuilding Theory and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission: 
Implications for Non-UN Interventions," Global Change, Peace and Security, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008, 280. 
244 National Statistics Directorate, Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004, 72. 
245 Ibid., 70; Timor Leste Ministry of Finance, Final Statistical Abstract: Timor-Leste Survey of 
Living Standards 2007 (Timor-Leste: Dili, National Statistics Directorate, 2008), 27. 
246 Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the 
Need for Inclusive Governance,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July/August 2006), 584–585. 
 62
a central point of patriotism.247  However, inappropriately, the Korean forces tried to 
teach English (and even Korean) to local people without deliberating on what was really 
needed by the Timorese. 
For developing countries, fulfilling children’s developmental capability 
and providing satisfactory educational opportunity is very important.248  Especially in 
countries with a large proportion of young people, national development is greatly 
influenced by improvement in their ability. 249  The Korean force held events like quiz 
competitions and speech contests.  According to one Korean officer, these were meant 
“to create in Timorese students an enthusiasm for learning.”250  However, there was no 
consistency or continuity in such activities during the Korean deployments; these events 
ended every six months when new contingents arrived.  The educational activities were 
one-time events in which each contingent honored its achievements without long-term 
considerations.  This indicates that, for the military, an unclear mandate cannot guarantee 
consistent activities. 
The Saemaul Movement was the most remarkable project among the 
various activities of the Korean force in East Timor in terms of building post-conflict 
social capacity.  As noted above, this project received great marks from NGOs, local 
governments and local populations.  The Homé Project had good intentions, with the 
Sangnoksu force reaching out for local participation and encouraging ownership of the 
project.  However, good intentions do not always produce the expected results.  This was 
the case with the Homé Project, mainly due to limitations in its sustainability and 
ownership. 
First of all, the voluntary participation of residents was extremely limited.  
Even though the project produced some small changes in ownership, having to do income 
generation based on crop sales, in most project activities, residents just followed the 
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village leader’s instruction, with encouragement from the Korean force. 251   Local 
participation in the decision-making process is important for building legitimacy and 
creating ownership.252  This process was absent in the Homé Project, and the ROKBATT 
was aware of it.  The Homecoming Report of the 4th Contingent suggested the need to 
encourage women’s associations or young adult groups to carry out the project by 
themselves.253  But this did not happen. 
Another problem is that the project did not last long after the Korean force 
moved to the Oecussi district in December 2001, partly because it did not achieve local 
ownership.  “Sustainability is the result of local ownership.”254  It would be very difficult 
to give the locals ownership of the project within the six-month rotation of each 
contingent.  As the literature notes, “[P]ost-conflict ownership may not only be difficult 
to achieve, but also inherently problematic,” given the fact that “local ownership is why 
conflicts emerged in the first place.”255 
However, there is a more important reason for the failure.  The Homé 
Project was not passed on effectively to other institutions, NGOs or the local government.  
The 5th Contingent proposed cooperation with the Korea Saemaul Undong Center for 
continuation of the Homé Project,256 but there was friction between the Ministry of 
National Defense and the Saemaul institution.  Although the Korea Saemaul Undong 
Center implemented other projects in East Timor from 2002 to 2003, they were not 
connected to the Homé Project.  The institution implemented its own projects in different 
regions in Lautem—Somoxo, Sika and others—but even those activities were on hiatus 
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after 2004. 257   Additionally, they bypassed local institutions, so there was little 
cooperation with local government.258  Several projects by the Korea Saemaul Undong 
Center, as well as the Sangnoksu Homé Project, could not be continued due to limited 
collaboration with Timorese governmental institutions. 
Saemaul Undong seemed like a good model project for reconstruction of 
the post-conflict rural communities of East Timor because it incorporates many necessary 
concepts of local capacity-building, such as ownership, a bottom-up approach, follow-up 
support, and an incentive program.259  Currently, 70 developing countries have imported 
the concepts of the Saemaul Movement.260  However, in East Timor, efforts to seed this 
concept by the Korean force failed.  Obviously, this was due to the disregard of project 
sustainability by the intervener—not the Sangnoksu force, but the Korean government—
as shown in the mandate.  The Korean government mandate did not enunciate specifics 
regarding capacity-building and sustainable development.  Also at fault was the Korean 
force’s inability to implement the project appropriately.  It was not well trained to 
implement such a mission and it was not the task of the military, but of other 
institutions—NGOs and donor institutions. 
Overall, capacity-building activities by the Korean forces resulted in 
failure.  No mandate or a vaguely articulated mandate for such a mission could not yield 
good fruit.  Although the Korean force tried to teach the Timorese how to catch fish, it 
                                                 
257 “International Activities: East Timor,” Korea Saemaul Undong Center, 
http://saemaul.com/english/international_act_easttimor.asp. Mostly, they were development support 
programs—for example, building a community center in Somoxo, a farming tool supply in Sika, and a 
power generator supply in Bauro. 
258 Alastair J. McKechnie, “Building Capacity in Post Conflict Countries,” World Bank Institute, No. 
5, March 2004, 1~2. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/CDBrief05.pdf. “Donors are 
often tempted to bypass weak government capacity and rebuild the country themselves, that is, contract 
services directly and provide assistance in kind. This strategy appears most attractive when government 
institutions are demonstrably weak, skilled nationals are in short supply, and fiduciary systems to ensure 
money goes to intended purposes are poorly or not at all developed.” 
259 Edward P. Reed, “Is Saemaul Undong a Model for Developing Countries Today?” (paper 
presented to the International Symposium in Commemoration of the 40th Anniversary of Saemaul Undong, 
Seoul, Korea, September 30, 2010), 13. 
http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/SaemaulUndongReedSept2010FINAL.pdf. 
260 Andrei Lankov, “Saemaul Undong Sets Model for Developing Countries,” The Korea Times, April 
16, 2010. http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2011/11/291_64301.html. 
 65
did not know how to attract and to cooperate with necessary local actors.  The method for 
teaching the local population how to fish was not precisely mandated. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines the Korean government’s mandate and the Korean forces' 
activities according to the mandate, divided into two major sections: security activity to 
restore and maintain order; and civil-military activity.  The security operation of the 
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Table 7. Security Operation of the Korean Force and its Results in East 
Timor 
The Sangnoksu force mostly followed the mandated security tasks in Order 99-4 
as written.  Influenced by the general direction in the order, the force accompanied 
security activities with friendship-building activities.  Due to the clause which strongly 
restricted the use of force, the Korean force tried to implement its security mission 
without disputes with locals.  The evidence confirms several positive results in the 
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- Mission with no elucidated 
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Table 8. Civil-Military Activity of the Korean Force and its Results in East 
Timor 
Overall, civil-military activity was less specifically defined in Order 99-4 than the 
security mission.  The Korean force’s activities for humanitarian assistance were a 
relative success considering that this mission was a short-term activity set in motion 
during the initial period following conflict.  However, it was limited in addressing 
rebuilding of the infrastructure, which was not mandated by the governmental order. 
Friendship-building activities were successful in overcoming cultural differences 
and attaining cooperation from the locals.  Although this mission was not christened as a 
civil-military activity, friendship-building was mandated by another clause directing 
general objectives and the code of conduct. 
On the other hand, the Sangnoksu force’s activity for capacity-building was not 
successful.  There was no clear mandate from the Korean government for such a mission, 
and the mandate contained no clause regarding deliberation for long-term development of 
post-conflict Timorese society.  Not unexpectedly, therefore, the Korean force did not 
implement this mission continuously.  Also, the force was not suitably trained and 
prepared to fulfill such an implied mandate.  As a result, it did not convey ownership to 
the local people and the project was not sustained after the Korean force left. 
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In conclusion, the case study of the Korean peacekeeping mission in East Timor 
indicates the following: for military peacekeeping contingents, the troop-contributing 
government should mandate clearly and specifically the terms of the mission’s scope; it 
should include a mandate to refrain from the use of force; and should contain a specific 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF A KOREAN COMBAT BATTALION IN 
LEBANON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The tenuous cessation of major violence made possible by the presence of the UN 
peacekeeping force UNIFIL I was shattered on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah levied war 
against Israel by launching rockets into Israeli territory.  Israeli forces entered the war 
with their overwhelming naval, air and land attacks.  Intense fighting, in which 1,187 
Lebanese and 160 Israelis were killed, continued until August, 2006.261  In response, the 
UN decided to strengthen the UNIFIL force and asked member states to contribute their 
military forces in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1701. 
After the request by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the Roh Moo-hyun 
administration agreed to dispatch Korean forces to Lebanon on November 8, 2006.  The 
Roh government announced the following rationale for participation in the peacekeeping 
operation: “As a member of international society and holding the honorable status of a 
country that produced a Secretary-General of the United Nations, we have a duty to aid in 
the fulfillment of the mission of the UN.  Also, through contributing to peace in the 
Middle East with UNIFIL, we expect to use this chance to improve relations with Arab 
countries.”262 
The Korean National Assembly approved the motion on December 22, 2006, and 
the Dongmyeong (“Light from the East”) force of 360 troops was organized in June 2007.  
As the fifth peacekeeping-operation mission in Korean history, the Dongmyeong force 
began its peacekeeping mission in July.  This was the second overseas deployment of 
Korean combat troops, the first being its peacekeeping in East Timor.  A motion for 
extension of the Dongmyeong force’s mission passed in July 2008, and the force remains 
in Lebanon today. 
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This chapter examines the Dongmyeong force’s peacekeeping operation in the 
same manner as the chapter on East Timor, and also provides a comparison of the two 
cases.  This chapter first discusses the Lebanon peacekeeping mandate assigned to the 
Korean force.  Then, activities of Korean forces in Lebanon in accordance with mandates 
are examined, divided into security activity and civil-military activity.  Finally, the 
successes and failures of the peacekeeping operation are assessed in light of the scope 
and content of the mandate.  
B. THE LEBANON PEACEKEEPING MANDATE ASSIGNED TO THE 
KOREAN FORCE 
Following the two-month war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Security Council 
issued Resolution 1701 on 11 August 2006.  The UN announced that the resolution “has 
significantly enhanced UNIFIL and expanded its original mandate.”263   Subsequently, 
UNIFIL was strengthened from 2,000 to 15,000 troops.  Resolution 1701 is composed of 
the following elements: 
a. Monitor the cessation of hostilities  
b. Accompany and support the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as they 
deploy throughout the south, as Israel withdraws its armed forces from 
Lebanon  
c. Coordinate these activities with the governments of Lebanon and Israel 
d. Extend assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian 
populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons  
e. Assist the LAF in taking steps towards the establishment between the 
Blue Line and the Litani River of an free of any armed personnel, assets 
and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of 
UNIFIL deployed in this area 
f. Assist the government of Lebanon in securing its borders and other 
entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of 
arms or related materiel.264  
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This resolution clearly defines the scope of the military contingents’ missions as 
“monitoring hostile actions in the Blue Line; supporting and assisting LAF to prevent 
armed personnel, assets and weapons from flowing into the region between the Blue Line 
and Litani river; and humanitarian assistance.”265  However, the resolution is vague with 
respect to use of force.266  In other words, although the clauses listed above called for a 
traditional peacekeeping operation under Chapter 6 of the UN charter, the materiel and 
arms of the military contingents did not match the equipment necessary to implement the 
Chapter 6 mission.  This is mainly due to the vague meaning of one sentence in 
Resolution 1701: 
UNIFIL is to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its 
forces…to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile 
activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it 
from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council to 
protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and 
equipment…to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical 
violence.267 
The robust rule of engagement bred deep distrust among Southern Lebanese.268  
Some military contingents tried to enforce their own “proactive interpretation” of the 
mandate, which resulted in peacekeeper casualties from a roadside car bomb.269  Even 
though Resolution 1701 is specific in its scope of the security mission for the most part, 
its mandate on use of force is not clear. 
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The Korean government gave several orders to the Dongmyeong force regarding 
the general direction of its activities in Lebanon.  For example, on 5 November 2007, the 
Korean Chiefs of Staff issued the “Dongmyeong Force General Operation Guideline.”  
However, they restricted access to specific contents of the mandate.  The Korean force’s 
operation under UNIFIL is a current military operation.  In such cases, mandates issued 
by governmental institutions—the Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff—are treated as confidential materials.  However, based on missions and activities of 
the Dongmyeong contingents delineated in Homecoming Reports and the fact that the 
Korean force is mandated to follow general directions of the UNIFIL mandate, one can 
deduce the mandates followed by the Korean contingents.  As of February 2012, ten 
Korean contingents have been deployed in UNIFIL.  Identification of their likely 
mandates is based on my analysis of the activities of five Dongmyeong contingents, using 
the 1st and 2nd Contingents’ reports for identifying initial period activities; the 4th and 
5th Contingents’ reports for intermediate period activities; and the 8th Contingent’s 
report for current activities.  The results are shown in Table 9. 
Mandate on Security Activity Mandate on Civil-military Activity 
1. Surveillance patrol/ 
Operate checkpoints 
1. Humanitarian assistance 
2. Counter-intelligence operation/ 
Operate EOD team 
2. Friendship-building 
3. Support and Cooperation with LAF 3. Capacity-building 
4. Enhancing positive relations with local populations/ 
Refraining from any activity likely to aggravate the relationship with locals 
Table 9. Mandate from the Korean Government for Peacekeeping 
Operation in Lebanon Deduced from Reports of Force Activities 
According to one Homecoming Report, security operations by the Dongmyeong 
force mainly followed the guidelines of UNIFIL Headquarters and the command of the 
UNIFIL Western Brigade.270  The Korean government likely ordered the Dongmyeong 
                                                 
270 Woong-gun Kim, The 1st Contingent Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of 
Dongmyeong Force (Seoul: Korean Lebanon Peacekeeping Force, 2008), 130. 
 73
force to follow the general guidelines of UNIFIL Force Headquarters.  Mandates 1 and 2 
follow from clause “a” of the UNIFIL mandate.  Mandate 3 follows clause “b.” 
One fact clearly identified throughout Homecoming Reports is that the 
Dongmyeong force does not distinguish its security activities from its efforts to give a 
good impression to local residents.  All the Korean contingents have thought that the 
success of their security operation could be achieved by building a positive relationship 
with local society, not just by a rigid military operation following mandates calling for 
maintaining law and order.  Thus, one clear mandate from the Korean government 
regarding security activity is an instruction to enhance positive relations with local 
populations and to refrain from any activity that might aggravate the relationship with 
locals—that is, Mandate 4.  This is similar to the East Timor peacekeeping mandate from 
the Korean government, which ordered the Sangnoksu force to establish friendly relations 
with locals as the first clause in Order 99-4.   
Compared with the Sangnoksu force case in East Timor, the Dongmyeong force 
was not given specific orders in its security activity.  In East Timor, the Korean 
government named the scope of its forces’ security activities one by one.271  On the other 
hand, the Korean government appears to have ordered the general direction of civil-
military activity because all the Homecoming Reports mention the same clear objective: 
to “build a pro-Korean mindset by promoting projects the locals want; win popularity 
from the residents; and, by both of which, ensure the safety of troops.”272  Seeing that 
most activities for humanitarian assistance and friendship-building have been 
implemented continuously throughout the deployment of all the contingents, it appears 
there is a clear mandate for these two categories, Mandates 1 and 2.  But the mandate for 
capacity-building is not clear, given that activities associated with capacity-building were 
not continued by subsequent contingents and that every contingent, without exception, 
held a project information session for village representatives and local government 
officers soon after their arrival. 
                                                 
271 See the Order 99-4 and Table 2. Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in East Timor. 
272 Gyeongsik Park, The 8th Contingent Homecoming Report: Activity of Dongmyeong Force (Seoul: 
PKO Center, 2011), 67. 
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We can see that mandates for civil-military activities were composed almost the 
same as in the East Timor case.  This means that the Korean government’s general 
directions for civil-military activities have not changed in the last ten years, 273  as 
demonstrated by the figures for forces activities in the field.  The difference in the 
Lebanon case is probably that both Mandate 1 and 2 are clearly stated by the Korean 
government.274  However, Mandate 3 continues to be less defined. 
In terms of the content of the mandate, it seems the Korean government did not 
clearly direct activities regarding the use of force except for an instruction to follow 
UNIFIL’s rule of engagement.  This is a salient point, and differs from the governmental 
direction in East Timor where the use of force was very restricted.  The Dongyeong force 
was equipped with armored vehicles, 81mm mortars, and heavy machine guns, as were 
other military contingents from NATO countries.  This is different from the East Timor 
peacekeeping case in which the Sangnoksu force withdrew its mortars with the 1st 
Contingent’s return, while the MNF replaced the UNTAET. 
However, one implied mandate from the Korean government, Mandate 4, applies 
at the advisory level.  It seems likely that it orders the Dongmyeong force to refrain from 
hasty action in applying the UNIFIL rule of engagement.  Mandate 4 is a contradictory 
one, compared to the directions included in Resolution 1701—“Commanders may take 
all necessary and appropriate action in self-defense, including preemptive self-defense in 
cases where there is adequate evidence that hostile units are committed to an immediate 
attack.”275  In this context, there is an element of uncertainty in judging the content of a 
mandate regarding “use of force.”  As in East Timor, the Korean government mandated 
using force as little as possible in Lebanon. 
There was likely no consideration of sustainable development of the post-conflict 
society in the Korean government mandate, as with the East Timor case.  This is at 
                                                 
273 During those ten years, Korea dispatched medical and engineer units to Afghanistan and Iraq 
under the MNF, and a division-sized Korean force was deployed in Iraq from 2003–2008 under the MNF. 
274 See Table 8. In the East Timor case, Mandate 1 was clearly defined, but Mandate 2 was less 
specific. 
275 Thom Shanker, “Trying to Avoid the Perils of Peacekeeping,” New York Times, 19 August, 2006. 
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variance with both from scholarly consensus on the required contents of peacekeeping 
mandates and the UNIFIL mandate.  Interestingly enough, as a lesson learned, the 8th 
Dongmyeong Contingent claimed the need for a long-term perspective in conducting 
civil-military activities.276 
In short, it is difficult to judge the scope of the security activity mandate from the 
Korean government except for the clearly identified Mandate 4.  In terms of civil-military 
activities, the Korean government’s mandate defines more in the area of humanitarian 
assistance and friendship-building, but defines less in the area of capacity-building.  With 
respect to the content of the mandate, it can be said that the Korean government order 
still did not contain a required element of current peacekeeping missions—consideration 
of sustainable development.  And somewhat equivocally, the Korean government advises 
minimum use of force. 
C. ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN LEBANON 
1. Security Activities of Dongmyeong Force 
The Dongmyeong forces’ security activities can be divided as shown in Table 10. 
Mandate Activities 
1. Surveillance patrol  
/ Operating checkpoints 
- Patrols for observation around Litani River 
- Patrols for presence in refugee camps and main roads 
- Patrols for contact in Lebanese villages 
- Operate checkpoints at entry point to Litani River. 
2. Counter-intelligence 
operation 
/ Operating EOD team 
- Collect information through contacts with residents. 
- Gather geographical intelligence 
- Detect IEDs in AOR 
3. Support and Cooperate with 
LAF 
- Conduct combined operations and joint tactical 
discussions with LAF 
- Implement goodwill activities and donate materials. 
4. Enhancing positive relations with local populations/ 
Refraining from any activity likely to aggravate the relationship with locals 
Table 10. Security Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in Lebanon 
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011) 
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Activities following security Mandate 1 are the most import security mission.  
The Dongmyeong force was responsible for reconnaissance and surveillance missions 
around the Litani River through which illegal personnel and arms enter the Southern 
Lebanon region.277  To fulfill the first mandate, the ROKBATT implemented observation 
patrols with armored vehicles with which it surveilled for Entry Points (EP) near the river.  
It also ran a checkpoint on the Litani Bridge according to directions from UNIFIL 
Headquarters.  The 8th  contingent operate a guard post on EP #28 to enhance the task. 
In three refugee camps—Qasmieh, Shabriha, and Jal Ek Baher—the Korea force 
patrolled to demonstrate its presence as a peacekeeping force to illegal paramilitary 
groups hiding in the refugee camps.  However, since the UNIFIL mandate restricted 
patrol tasks to monitoring hostilities, the Dongmyeong force most likely employed only 
passive actions without contacting refugees.  This response was also greatly influenced 
by its own government’s Mandate 4.  On the other hand, the Korean force tried to 
actively apply contact patrols by patrolling Lebanese villages on foot and contacting 
residents directly.  This was because Korean peacekeepers regard such patrols as a means 
to positive relations with local populations.  The patrols increased the frequency of 
contact with local residents. 278   Korean peacekeepers implement contact patrol, 
considering it as one of civil-military activities.279 
Contact patrols are also a major activity in fulfilling security Mandate 2.  The 
Korean force maintains a list of residential collaborators, and the number of people on the 
list increased the longer the Dongmyeong forces were stationed there.  Using direct 
contact with residents to collect regional information, the Dongmyeong force identified 
the Hezbolah's efforts to construct a communication line and reported it to UNIFIL 
                                                 
277 Hussein Dakroub, “Security Worries Escalate in South,” The Daily Star, 13 December, 2011. The 
UNIFIL Force Commander stressed the importance of this mission in his speech, saying, “One of the most 
important provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 is to ensure that there are no armed 
personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL in the area 
between the Blue Line and the Litani River.” 
278 Namsik In, Implications and Challenges of Korean Peacekeeping Troops in Lebanon (Seoul: 
Institution of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 2007), 17. 
279 Chan-Ock Kang, The 2nd Contingent Homecoming Report: Outcomes and Lessons of 
Dongmyeong Force (Seoul: Korean Lebanon Peacekeeping Force, 2008), 120. 
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Headquarters. 280   Additionally, the Korean force employed an Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD) team which implemented over one hundred Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) detecting operations on average per contingent. 
Mandate 3 is an order to support and assist the LAF’s military control of Southern 
Lebanon under the UNIFIL mandate.  The ROKBATT fulfilled this mandate by 
participating in several joint military operations with the LAF, including a Coordinated 
Patrol Operation (CPO) and a Counter Rocket Launching Operation (CRLO).  However, 
the Dongmyeong force supplemented these tasks with efforts to create a positive 
relationship with LAF.  With the necessity for frequent base changes due to military 
stabilization operations all over Lebanon, the LAF has poor facilities.  The Korean force 
tried to fulfill security Mandate 3 by providing LAF forces with various materials and 
through good will sports activities as shown Table 11. 
1st 
Contingent 
-  Donating vehicles (13 SUVs) 
- Supplying electronics (computer, washer) 
- Sporting apparatus 
- Road pavement 
2nd 
Contingent 
- Constructing military amenities - Constructing water supply 
4th and 5th 
Contingents 
- Remodeling LAF Operations Center    




- Donating vehicles (bus and SUV) - Building 
communication network 
Table 11. Donations from Korea forces to LAF 
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011) 
The security Mandate 4 directly or indirectly influenced all the security activities 
of the Korean forces.  Homecoming Reports show that the Korean peacekeepers were 
very cautious in their behavior when they met local populations because disharmony with 
residents could endanger the efforts of the military force and even the lives and safety of 
the peacekeepers.  In implementing contact patrols, excessive activity to acquire 
information was taboo in the Korean force.   
                                                 
280 Ibid., 117. 
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The force did not try to contact people in the refugee camps.  Furthermore, the security 
Mandate 4 had an impact on Mandate 3 as well, as the Korean forces tended to rely on 
material donations and friendship exchanges with the LAF. 
In its missions related to maintaining security and order, ROKBATT chiefly kept 
the mandates elucidated in UNIFIL mandate.  However, while following the UNIFIL 
mandates, the Korean implementation was probably greatly influenced by specific 
directions from the Korean government—that is, Mandate 4.  In common with the East 
Timor case, it put more emphasis on fulfilling the governmental mandate first, although 
the Dongmyeong force was not ordered by its government to conduct overall security 
tasks.  This is clearly demonstrated by the influence of Mandate 4 in implementing other 
security mandates.  As with East Timor case, both Korean peacekeeping forces conducted 
their security missions along with efforts at friendship building with local societies while 
refraining from use of force. 
2. Civil-Military Activities of Dongmyeong Force 
The Dongmyeong force’s civil-military activities are shown in Table 12. 
Mandate Activities 
1. Humanitarian assistance - Medical aid activity/Angel Gabriel Project 
2. Friendship-building 
-Taekwondo classes 
- Resident invitation events 
3. Capacity-building 
- Computer and Korean classes 
- Supporting local government institutions 
- Residents’ Long-Cherished Project 
4. Enhancing positive relations with local populations/ 
Refraining from any activity likely to aggravate the relationship with locals. 
Table 12. Civil-Military Activities in Accordance with the Mandate in 
Lebanon (From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011) 
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a. Activities by Mandate 1: Humanitarian Assistance  
Following Mandate 1 for humanitarian relief, the Korean force vigorously 
implemented medical aid activity.  Soon after deploying to Lebanon, the 1st Contingent 
increased medical aid services to four times a week and the consultation hours of the 
medical team to six hours a day.281  The 8th Contingent of the Dongmyeong force 
provided medical services even on weekends.  Veterinarians deployed with the 
Dongmyeong force took care of livestock, a service welcomed by residents.  Furthermore, 
the Korean force helped the Lebanon government establish a Blood Bank in Tyre.282  To 
date, the medical team has treated more than 30,000 patients, out of a population of 
50,000, along with 6,100 livestock in outreach efforts to local villages.283 
In providing relief, the Dongmyeong force distributed medical 
wheelchairs, hearing aids, crutches and other medical equipment for disabled and special 
needs children under the name of the Angel Gabriel Project. 284   The project was 
introduced by the 5th Contingent and received positive publicity from the local news 
media.285  Following these first efforts, the Korean forces continued the project with the 
support of a private Korean medical firm.286  The Korean force in Lebanon actively 
carried out humanitarian assistance under the civil-military affairs Mandate 1 as 
specifically ordered by its government. 
As in East Timor, ROKBATT in Lebanon also actively participated in 
humanitarian assistance, focusing on emergency life-saving assistance involving health 
                                                 
281 Woong-gun Kim, 163. The Italian Battalion—which had charge of the region before deployment 
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care services and provision of relief goods.287  Unlike the case in East Timor, where the 
Sangnoksu engineering unit constructed bridges, roads, and even irrigation canals, the 
engineering unit of the Dongmyong force did little infrastructure reconstruction.  There 
likely was a different direction given by the Korean government for participating in such 
enabling programs.  Under Mandate 3, capacity-building, the Dongmyeong force helped 
the locals reconstruct their facilities. 
b. Activities by Mandate 2: Friendship-Building  
Friendship-building is the mandate most emphasized by the Korean 
government and in all the Homecoming Reports.  The Dongmyeong force determined 
that activities for friendship-building were the key element in achieving the objectives of 
overall civil-military activities.  It was referred to as the “Korea Effect.”288  Although 
there was somewhat of a difference in terms of clarity in the scope of the mandate, the 
Dongmyeong force attained the objectives in similar ways in East Timor.289 
As in East Timor, the Korean force continuously used Taekwondo classes 
to build positive relationships with the local people.  Taekwondo classes were first run in 
three villages and were expanded to five villages in response to local demand.  Korean 
peacekeepers now instruct an average of 250 children every year.290  To date, 56 martial-
art experts have been fostered by ROKBATT. 
The Korean force organized several invitational events to cultivate 
friendship between peacekeepers and local residents.  In these events, the two parties 
participate in goodwill sports matches and cultural exchanges while performing 
traditional dances and sharing traditional foods.  The Dongmyeong force concludes with 
                                                 
287 As noted in Chapter III, the terms ““emergency life-saving assistance” and “enabling program” 
come from the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping. 
288 Jinsub Cho, “Variety of Civil Operations Elevate the Status of the Korean Force, Defense Journal, 
Vol. 452, August 2011, 9. 
289 In the East Timor case, friendship-building was not specified in civil-military activities in the 
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clearly mandated in East Timor. 
290 Suckho Ahn, “Becoming Popularity in Taekwondo and Korean Classes in Lebanon,” Segye Ilbo, 
July 19, 2011. http://www.segye.com/. 
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a “brotherhood ties” ceremony, which signified a declaration of fraternity.291  These 
events were started by the 1st Contingent, and subsequent troops have organized similar 
events every month in different villages.  For the purpose of friendship-building, 
ROKBATT also invites residents to weekly showings of the latest films. 
The Dongmyeong force also carries out the “Inviting Korea” event.  As 
part of a goodwill exchange program, every Korean contingent invites Lebanese officials 
and students to Seoul in hope of promoting a pro-Korea mindset.292  Two Lebanese 
mayors in AOR attended the inauguration of the Korean President,293 and a popular 
Lebanese singer was named an honorary ambassador for the Republic of Korean UNIFIL 
force and appeared on a widely-viewed Korean TV program.294  These activities are 
intended to promote a pro-Korean attitude, and this objective is clearly identified in 
Homecoming Reports. 
c. Activities for Capacity-Building  
As with the East Timor case, there is no elucidated mandate for capacity-
building from the Korean government, nor is there any consideration for sustainable 
development of the local society.  However, after examining all activities throughout the 
Korean peacekeeping contingents and categorizing them based on the nature of the 
activities, one can organize capacity-building activities of ROKBATT in the manner 





                                                 
291 The Daily Star, “South Korean Peacekeepers Reach Out to Locals,” July 29, 2007. 
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Division Capacity-Building Activities 
1st 
Contingent 
- Building bridges/paving roads (2 places) 
- Construction of village sewage treatment plant 
- Construction of senior community center and children playground (2 villages) 
- Improving medical facilities (4 villages) 
- Remodeling school facility and government office 
2nd 
Contingent 
- Paving roads /maintaining village street (4 places) 
- Donating garbage trucks 
- Constructing village park 






- Installation of sewing class (4 villages) 
- Donation of wastebaskets and garbage trucks 
- Paving roads (2 places) 
- Constructions town square and gymnasium  
Operating 
sewing classes  
5th 
Contingent 
- Installation of water purifiers (16 places) 
- Installation of village rest areas (21 places) 
- Installation of bench (126 places) 
- Expansion and maintenance roads (2 places) 
- Construction of a soccer field 
- Remodel of government office 
- Donation garbage trucks 
8th 
Contingent 
- Construction of water treatment plant 
- Construction of agriculture factory 
- Construction of village sports park 
- ‘Korean Road’ project 
Table 13. Capacity-building Activities of Korean Contingents in Lebanon 
(From: Homecoming Reports of the Dongmyeong Forces, 2007–2011) 
Based on its own judgment that supporting the educational environment is 
significant for the development of the local society and that targeting the young and 
vulnerable would quickly impact of civil-military activity,295 the Dongmyeong force 
implemented several projects related to education.  To date, it has assisted in remodeling 
of 15 of the 17 schools in its AOR.  In those projects, the force has provided computers, 
desks, chairs, and school supplies with the support of Korean firms.296   
                                                 
295 Chan-Ock Kang, 91. 
296 Hong-guk Oh, 233. 
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The 2nd Contingent equipped computer and Korean-language classes in five villages, and 
currently nearly 400 Lebanese have completed the courses.297  The force also ran a 
scholarship program for students in financial need.298 
One of the most focused programs of the Korean force was a local 
development program named “Residents’ Long-Cherished Project,” for which over five 
million dollars was spent as of 2011.299  This program implements a locally desired 
development project.  To do that, every Contingent held a meeting to hear what the locals 
needed from local officers and village leaders.  Unlike in East Timor, where the Korean 
engineering unit constructed parks, roads, and other facilities, the Dongmyeong force 
tried to construct projects with a local construction company after competitive open 
bidding.  Most of the activities associated with the project involve road paving, donation 
of wastebaskets and garbage trucks, construction of parks and the like.  Additionally, 
through a sewing class and agriculture factory project, the Dongmyeong force has 
worked to create jobs and increase incomes for residents. 
Under the Residents’ Long-Cherished Project, the Korean force supported 
the local government which suffered from poor facilities due to lack of funding.300  To 
improve the poor situation of Lebanese governmental organizations, the Korean force 
improved aging facilities and built town halls and squares.  It also donated office 
equipment, including computers, printers and copiers, to help cover local governments’ 
administrative needs. 
The Korean force in Lebanon employed similar educational projects as in 
East Timor under Mandate 3, while trying to improve educational environments and 
operating computer and Korean classes.  However, the Saemaul Project was not used in 
Lebanon.  Instead, the Dongmyeong force introduced the Saemaul Movement to local 
leaders and university students in its invitational events—invitations to the force base and 
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even to Seoul.  These were somewhat passive measures compared to the active, 
participatory schemes of the Sangnoksu force in the Homé Project.  As an alternative, 
Korean peacekeepers contributed to local infrastructure reconstruction by promoting the 
Residents’ Long-Cherished Project.  However, as in the East Timor case, these activities 
were not continuously implemented by follow-on contingents and such projects were not 
connected with one other.  It appears this is due to ambiguous governmental mandates in 
regard to this capacity-building sector. 
D. ASSESSMENTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF KOREAN FORCES IN 
LEBANON 
1. Assessment of Korean Force Security Activities 
Evaluating the effectiveness of the security activities of the Dongmyeong force in 
its AOR is not easy.  Unlike Korean peacekeeping operations in East Timor, where the 
force took charge of an entire district, the Dongmyeong force has controlled small 
portions of the Southern Lebanon district as one of several military contingents in the 
UNIFIL Force.  This means actions by the Dongmyeong force have limited connections 
to the security situation of the province.  The force’s main security mission was not 
policing, but just observation.  Therefore, it is hard to say that the security situation in the 
Southern Lebanon, especially the major southern city of Tyre, results from security 
activities of the Dongmyeong force.301 
However, it can be said that the force’s security activities overall, along with 
those other diverse UNIFIL contingents have not been positive.  Since the beginning of 
UNIFIL II in August 2007, terrorist acts and conflicts have continued around Tyre.  An 
attempt to destroy a UNIFIL patrol vehicle on October 2007 failed due to a technical 
problem in the bomb’s detonator.302  More recently, there were three terrorist attacks in 
                                                 
301 The Korean force is taking charge of a small northern portion of Tyre city and its countryside, 
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November and December 2011 in Tyre.303  This shows that illegal arms and personnel—
mainly terrorists in refugee camps and local gatherings—continue to flow into the region 
through the Litani River and other routes.  That is, a crucial security mission of UNIFIL 
was not effective.  Although the 5th Korean Contingent installed lampposts to enhance its 
observation mission in EP #28 (the Kasimia Bridge, a must-pass place for entering 
southern Lebanon) there is a fundamental limitation in implementing this mission 
effectively.  With an average of more than 10,000 vehicles passing over the Kasimia 
Bridge every day, it is not feasible to identify a suspected terrorist vehicle, as one 
Homecoming Report admits.304 
In spite of this, there is some positive information regarding the results of a 
security operation by the Korean force.  There have been no terrorist attacks at the 
villages where the Dongmyeong force is in charge.  According to Lebanese local news, 
the Dongmyeong force is the only UNIFIL military contingent which can conduct its 
diverse activities without the protection of a LAF escort.305  This reveals to some extent 
the effectiveness of the Korean force security activities in its AOR.  In addition, no 
Korean peacekeeper casualties have been reported since deployments began over 4 years 
ago.306 
These facts all attest to the success of Korean force security activities strongly 
influenced by Mandate 4.  As noted above, the Dongmyeong force emphasizes positive 
relations with locals and the LAF while conducting its security missions.  In fact, such a 
specific mandate from the Korean government likely contributed to the relative success 
of the Dongmyeong force security mission.  Southern Lebanese leadership speeches attest 
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to this.  At a meeting to discuss the attack on Irish peacekeepers, Tyre’s mayor 
complimented the Dongmyeong force activity, saying that “Special and close ties have 
been built among the Korean troops and Southerners, and we are proud to have built ties 
with peace-loving individuals.”307 
Since the Dongmyeong force manages only a small portion within the Southern 
Lebanon district (and therefore few statistical resources, like crime rates, are relevant to 
describing the security situation), it is hard to find a causal connection between 
quantitative data regarding the security situation and the Korean force’s activities in 
regard to just “observing” law and order.  However, residents’ positive perceptions of the 
security activities of the Dongmyeong force influenced by Mandate 4 help the Korean 
peacekeepers conduct their mission with lessened concern for personal safety.  Such an 
approach might even mitigate negative local attitudes toward UNIFIL forces.308  UNIFIL 
Force Commander Major-General Alberto Asata Cuevas emphasizes the importance of 
close cooperation with local residents, organizations and the LAF in enhancing security 
measures.309  The Dongmyeong force activities in this spectrum help to maintain a secure 
environment in its AOR, even if not in the overall Tyre region.  The UNIFIL Commander 
evaluated the Dongmyeong Contingent as an exemplary peacekeeping force that was 
achieving positive recognition from LAF and residents.310 
To sum up, the evidence cannot demonstrate that efforts by the Dongmyeong 
force have improved the security situation, given the ongoing conflicts in the region and 
the force’s operational limitations in dealing with the challenging security environment.  
The UNIFIL force has had difficulty helping the LAF manage conflicts in the region, so 
its security operation cannot be called a success.  Indeed, conflicts in Lebanon are most 
influenced by internal and external political and diplomatic situations involving diverse 
                                                 
307 Mohammed Zaatari, “Local Authorities Meet with UNIFIL to Discuss Attack,” The Daily Star, 
January 15, 2008. 
308 Many residents recognized the Korean force as just one among the US allies when it first deployed 
there. However, they now regard Korean peacekeepers as their friends and brothers, according to several 
interviews with local residents.  Ung-suk Ko, “Local Lebanese ‘Dongmyeong force is Our Brother’,” 
Yonhap News Agency, June 29, 2010. 
309 Hussein Dakroub, “Security Worries Escalate in South,” The Daily Star, 13 December, 2011. 
310 Yonhap News Agency, Third Anniversary of Dongmyeong Force in Lebanon,” July 18, 2010. 
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stakeholders, like domestic political parties and Hezbollah (backed by Syria and Iran311) 
rather than by effective security operations of UNIFIL forces.  In this context, judging the 
success or failure of Korean force security activity is difficult.  However, to the extent 
that Korean peacekeepers have successfully allayed local mistrust of peacekeeping 
activities and boosted residents’ hopes for the security situation, the Dongmyeong have 
gained at least limited success in the security mission in its AOR.  Such success is 
obviously greatly impacted by Mandate 4. 
As in the East Timor case, the limited success of the security mission of the 
Korean force in Lebanon results from its friendship-building efforts coupled with its 
security activities. 312   Although the Korean government only specifically ordered 
Mandate 4, it is clear that the mandate had a dramatic influence on other security 
missions.  This suggests that even though governmental mandate offers condensed 
direction, the peacekeeping forces were more focused on fulfilling its governmental 
mandates.  This yielded more positive outcomes when the mandate was specifically 
stated. 
2. Assessment of Korean Force’s Civil-Military Activities 
a. Assessment of Activities for Humanitarian Relief 
Given the post-conflict environment with large displaced populations and 
exposure to communicable diseases, short-term relief and assistance by peacekeeping 
contingents is necessary.313  Lebanese living in the Southern district were subject to 
insufficient medical facilities and difficult conditions created in the last two decades.314  
In response, the Korean force has tried to reach as many patients as possible with its 
                                                 
311 Nadim Shehadi, "Futile Victory," The World Today, Vol. 64, No. 6, June 2008, 13. 
312 As described in the previous chapter, despite limitations on policing activities stemming from the 
limited number of soldiers responsible for a large area, the Korean force in East Timor had positive results 
in its security operations, making up for its weakness by building friendships with local populations and 
creating a peaceful atmosphere. 
313 Hugh Waters et al., Rehabilitating Health Systems in Post-Conflict Situations (Helsinki: United 
Nations University, 2007), 2–3. 
314 Hong-guk Oh, “The Republic of Korea Armed Forces’ Civil Operations in Lebanon,” Military 
History, Vol. 73, December 2009, 228. 
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medical services, in the same way as the Korean medical unit did in East Timor.  
Recently, the Korean medical team in Lebanon provided 40,000 residents with medical 
checkups.315  This is praiseworthy, given that the number of residents in its AOR is about 
50,000.  Active response by the Korean force to immediate health needs is also an 
essential step toward post-conflict rehabilitation of the health sector.316 
However, beyond the number of patients treated, it is necessary to check 
whether the medical activity of the Korean medical team was appropriate for 
improvement of local health conditions.  According to research by experts in the World 
Health Organization (WHO), one of most significant health problems in countries 
recovering from war is “the growing numbers of people with illnesses such as high blood 
pressure and diabetes.”317  This was true in Lebanon.318  To deal with this problem, the 
Korean medical team tries to help as many patients as possible with these categories of 
health problems.  Sixty-five percent of the patients treated by the Dongmyeong medical 
unit suffer from high blood pressure and diabetes.319  When these accomplishments are 
compared with the East Timor case, the Dongmyeong force can be proud of themselves 
and the Korean government.  In reality, the medical unit in East Timor faced limitations 
in dealing with the health problems of the local society, especially tropical diseases, and 
the medical unit had to seek the help of other international institutions.  However, this is 
                                                 
315 The Daily Star, “South Korean UNIFIL Provide 40,000 Checkups,” January 13, 2012. 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/. 
316 Hugh Waters et al.  They suggest three steps for health sector rehabilitation in post-conflict society: 
“(1) an initial response to immediate health needs; (2) the restoration or establishment of a package of 
essential health services; and (3) rehabilitation of the health system itself. These three approaches should 
operate synergistically and as part of a continuum.” 
317 The Daily and Sunday Express, “Health Alert on Post-conflict Areas,” January 1, 2012. 
http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/292951. 
318 In Lebanese society, chronic and degenerative diseases became more prevalent.  Diabetes and 
hypertension affected respectively, 13 and 26 percent of the adult population. Centre for Administrative 
Innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region, Welfare in the Mediterranean Countries: LEBANON (Italy: 
C.A.I.MED., 2005), 15. http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/cache/documents/9383.pdf. 
319 KBS World, “S. Korean Unit in Lebanon Treats 20,000th Patient,” May 3, 2010, 
http://world.kbs.co.kr/. 
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different in Lebanon, perhaps because of the Korean forces’ accumulated experience in 
medical aid services in post-conflict societies.320 
Medical activities by the Korean force are well received by Lebanese 
residents.  Many residents wait in line to get medical service every morning.321  In 
recognition of these medical efforts, local residents gave the Dongmyeong force a special 
nickname, “God Sent.”322  The medical efforts by the Dongmyeong force are successful 
in that they took proper actions to deal with initial post-conflict health problems.  
b. Assessment of Friendship-Building Activity  
The friendship activities of the Korean force can be assessed by residents’ 
evaluations about how they felt toward the activity of the UNIFIL force in their region 
and how they perceive South Koreans.  Since the activity of the Dongmyeong force has 
been an ongoing operation for only four years, it is hard to evaluate locals’ long-term 
perceptions of the Korean force.  However, its current reputation among residents as 
expressed in news articles is positive.  Rather, the local society sees the Korean 
peacekeepers as kind-hearted, generous people who suffered a similar difficult security 
situation.  They call the Korean force their “brothers and congenial friends.”323  As for 
the most well-known Korean activity, a local news station reports that Taekwondo 
training is in public favor throughout the south of the country, helping build bridges with 
the local population.324  The number of Taekwondo students increased throughout the 
villages, creating the need for training space in local municipalities.  Taekwondo has 
been included in regular education courses at the Lebanese Military Academy since 
                                                 
320 The Korean medical units continuously participated in diverse oversee missions in post-conflict 
societies. They were deployed at Iraq, Western Sahara, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.  The Ministry of 
National Defense, “Activities of Korean Forces Out of Korea,” http://www.peacekeeping.go.kr/.  
321 Ung-suk Ko, “Local Lebanese ‘Dongmyeong Force is Our Brother’,” Yonhap News Agency, June 
29, 2010. 
322 LBCI News, “Korean UNIFIL Troops a ‘Godsend’ for residents in the South,” October 24, 2011. 
http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news.  
323 Ung-suk Ko, “Local Lebanese ‘Dongmyeong Force is Our Brother’,” Yonhap News Agency, June 
29, 2010. 
324 Jihad Siqlawi, “South Korean UN Troops Kick up Taekwondo Storm in Lebanon,” Agence 
France-Presse, April 18, 2008. 
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2009. 325   Active cooperation of residents and local authorities reflects successful 
friendship-building through Taekwondo education. 
Friendship-building is well documented in community stories.  A local 
news outlet reports that the Korean contingent has successfully wooed inhabitants with its 
variety of services.326  Local residents think that the Korean peacekeepers believe that 
peacekeeping success is achieved by building close ties to the local society.  A Lebanese 
local news source says that the Dongmyeong force made “a qualitative leap in 
relationships” with locals and the force has the most outstanding achievement among the 
various UNIFIL efforts. 327   Additionally, locals appreciate that the Koreans try to 
understand their culture and to get close to them as friends.328 
Although it is too early to speculate on a long-term outcome, the Korean 
force is gaining in terms of friendship-building.  It has implemented various friendship 
activities throughout all its contingents under the clearly stated Korean government 
Mandate 2.  Compared to the East Timor case, the Korean government mandate about 
friendship-building in Lebanon is much more clearly defined.329  This clear mandate on 
friendship-building has produced quite quick positive outcomes.  Indeed, the evidence 
confirms that residents had a positive reaction from as early as 2008 with the projects of 
the 2nd Contingent. 
c. Assessment of Capacity-Building Activity 
The diverse development programs of the Korean force received a very 
positive reputation from the local society, calling the Korean peacekeepers a “present  
 
                                                 
325 Suckjong Lee, “Dongmyeong Force Invites Lebanese Military Cadet for Friendship,” Defense 
Daily, September 8, 2009. 
326 Amal Khalil, “Celebrating Seoul in South Lebanon,” Alakhbar, December 22, 2011. 
http://english.al-akhbar.com. 
327 LBCI News. 
328 Chungsin Jung, “Dongmyeong Force’s Success in Achieving Peace and Winning the Mind,” 
Munhwa Ilbo, June 1, 2008. 
329 As discussed in Chapter II, friendship building was offered as a general direction of civil-military 
activities in East Timor. 
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bestowed by God” and changing a street called “Maraka” to “Korean Road” as thanks to 
the Dongmyeong capacity-building activities and to memorize the positive relationship 
between the two parties.330 
Aside from these encouraging words, capacity-building activities in post-
conflict societies should be evaluated by the two critical concepts of ownership and 
sustainability.  For example, local firm began several construction projects after 
competitive open bidding, and sewing classes and construction of an agriculture factory 
were intended to help local populations gain ownership.  These projects might indicate 
that ROKBATT has promoted activities in the proper direction, meeting the objective of 
development activity in a post-conflict area.  Yet, many other projects were implemented 
to promote Korean products and some were not appropriate to the local environment.  For 
instance, a donated garbage truck shipped from South Korea was unusable because it did 
not match the garbage collecting system in Lebanon.331 
The Korean force started the Residents’ Long-Cherished Project with the 
aim of creating a pro-Korean mindset under Mandate 4, rather than to fulfill Mandate 3.  
In other words, while activities under Mandate 3 were supposed to increase the capacity-
building of the local society when classified according to the nature of the activity, the 
Dongmyeong force did not have such recognition.  This is likely due to the vagueness of 
the Korean mandate and a failure to clearly define the objective of these activities.  
Except for the 8th Contingent, most Dongmyeong Contingents explain in their 
Homecoming Reports that they conducted development programs to promote a pro-
Korean mindset.  It is likely that there is no consideration of sustainable development for 
post-conflict society in the Korean government mandate.  Most of the Residents’ Long-
Cherished Projects were begun to meet the expectations of residents, not the Korean 
force’s own judgment, and were pursued without serious long-term consideration of 
                                                 
330 Sisoo Park, “Unit Sparks Hallyu in Lebanon,” The Korea Times, July 18, 2011. 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/. 
331 Hong-guk Oh, 235. 
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sustainable development.  Therefore, the projects are not distributed properly in accord 
with village population proportions, as pointed out by the 5th Contingent.332 
Owing to troop shifts, many projects are short-term, and many local 
residents realize that programs are severed every six months.333  In other words, there 
was little interconnection of development programs between the Korean contingents.  It 
also seems that residents just want somebody to get a program accomplished rather than 
take responsibility for development themselves.  It can be said that the Dongmyeong 
force’s capacity-building activities have not suitably promoted ownership.  
These somewhat negative results might be anticipated by referring to the 
case of East Timor where a vague governmental mandate regarding capacity-building did 
not result in many positive outcomes.  However, the Korean government did not 
objectively evaluate the results of East Timor peacekeeping.  This is surely due to the 
government’s lack of appropriate standards for assessing peacekeeping operations.  
Likewise in Lebanon, the unclear capacity-building mandate not only failed to guide 
consistent activities among the successive Sangnoksu contingents, but also has not had 
positive results.  However, the 8th Dongmyeong Contingent began to recognize these 
problems, itself a positive development.334  The issue is whether the Korean government 
also recognizes the problems and will order a new, more concrete mandate regarding 
capacity-building.  Given that the Korean peacekeeping operation in Lebanon is a current 
operation, long term results may take a while. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examines mandates assigned to the Korean force in UNIFIL and its 
activities according to the mandate, comparing them with the East Timor case discussed 
in Chapter III.  The security operations and results are summarized in Table 14. 
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Table 14. Security Operation of the Korean Force and its Results in Lebanon 
The Dongmyeong force mostly followed the UNIFIL mandates in implementing 
security tasks, except for Mandate 4.  Therefore, it is difficult to judge whether the scope 
of the mandate from the Korean government is clear.  However, the Korean force 
activities are intensely influenced by Mandate 4.  As in East Timor, ROKBATT in 
Lebanon employed friendship-building efforts alongside its security tasks.  In terms of 
the mandate’s content, the Korean government probably advises applying the UNIFIL 
rule of engagement in limited circumstances.  This differs slightly from the Korean 
government’s strong restrictions on use of force in East Timor.  In both case studies, the 
Korean government hesitates to mandate use of force, to protect vulnerable people and 
even the armed force itself. 
Given continuing violence and conflict in the northern part of southern Lebanon, 
it is hard to say that Korean force security operation produced successful outcomes.  In its 
own AOR, the security activities of ROKBATT are a partial success although it is too 
early to judge the long-term results.  There are so far no peacekeeper fatalities in the 
Korean force’s AOR.  Only a few conflicts, and no terrorist attacks, have been reported 
there.  Under the influence of Mandate 4 and a mandate for minimum use of force, the 
Korean force has changed residents’ perception of UNIFIL security activities in the 
area.335  Although it is not as explicit a success as the East Timor case, the Dongmyeong 
force’s security activity has had some limited success. 
                                                 
335 Lebanese believed that the UNIFIL force was secretly passing information to Israel.  This was 
different in the Korean force’s AOR, where residents waved their hands at Korean UNIFIL peacekeepers 
and their armored vehicles.  Tae-Hoon Lee, “Inconvenient Truth about Korean Troops Abroad,” The Korea 
Times, August 8, 2011. See also, Sungho Jung, “Plant a Peace in Lebanon,” KBS News, August 23, 2009. 
http://news.kbs.co.kr/world/2009/08/23/1832986.html. 
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- Vigorous efforts in medical aid 
following a clear mandate success 
Friendship-
building Clear 
- Diverse activities to promote 





- Employing projects to meet 
residents’ demands failure 
Table 15. Civil-Military Activity of the Korean Force and its Results in 
Lebanon 
With respect to humanitarian assistance and friendship-building activities, more 
clearly mandated by the Korean government than in the case of East Timor, it is clear that 
they made the grade.  The medical aid of ROKBATT, an important initial activity in 
post-conflict humanitarian relief, achieved desirable results, treating nearly 80 percent of 
residents and dealing with ailments requiring attention in the community.  The Korean 
force’s experience providing medical services in post-conflict societies is clearly 
reflected in the Korean mission in Lebanon, and friendship-building activities have both a 
pro-Korean mindset and positive recognition. 
On the other hand, there is probably no explicit mandate about capacity-building, 
as with the East Timor case.  Whether or not there is an order related to sustainable 
development is not clearly confirmed.  Considering the purposeful direction that 
capacity-building activity ought to produce in a post-conflict society, in this field the 
Korean forces appear to have lost their way.  There was no consistent direction and little 
interconnection of capacity-building activities.  The Korean forces failed to encourage 
locals to take ownership of their long-term social development.  Many Residents’ Long-
Cherished Projects (and especially donation activities) were conducted in conjunction 
 95
with visits by important figures.  Some are probably no more than attractive products 
meant to last only as long as the sponsoring contingent’s deployment.  This approach is 
never good for sustainable development in a war-torn society. 
If the Korean government had learned from past peacekeeping experiences in the 
capacity-building field, it could have nipped in these problems in the bud.  This did not 
happen because the government had not yet conducted objective evaluations based on 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigates the appropriate role of Korean peacekeepers in post-
conflict societies and the function of the troop-contributing government of Korea in 
leading successful peace operations. It examines scholarly discussions regarding 
peacekeeping success—including conditions and criteria for successful peacekeeping—
and applies the factors regarding mandates to Korean peace operations in East Timor and 
Lebanon.  The two country case studies view the results of Korean peace operations from 
a long-term perspective, applying relevant evaluation factors closely related to the nature 
of peacekeeping force activities, and avoiding evaluations based on reports from local 
media and Korean pro-governmental news networks. 
A. SUMMARY 
From the literature review, it is clear that there is little research on the activities of 
each military peacekeeping component and on assessing mission accomplishment of 
donor military forces.  Discussions in Korea about peace operations tend to center on its 
diplomatic effects, downplaying the appropriate role of Korean forces with respect to 
reconstruction of post-conflict societies.  This means that activities of military 
peacekeeping contingents at the tactical level required close examination.  
Considering discussions on peace operation mandates for successful mission 
implementation, I conclude that a clear scope of mandate, specifically and narrowly 
stated, is necessary to prevent conflicting interpretations by various peacekeepers and 
military contingents.  A specific and clear mandate not only helps forefend peacekepts’ 
divergent expectations as to the results of peace operations, but also gets public support 
from troop-contributing countries and local parties in dispute.  With regard to the content 
of mandates, most scholars and the UN regard a use of force to restore law and order as 
required content in mandates for contemporary peace operations.  The scholars also 
advise including clauses regarding sustainable development in the post-conflict society.  
Given that the military is strongly governed by the limitations of its mission 
strategy and that military personnel are accustomed to implementing specifically spelled-
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out mandates, 336  more specific and clearer mandates are needed for successful 
peacekeeping by military contingents.  Since military troops are supposed to prepare an 
initial framework for overall peace operations, they need a strong mandate, and one that 
includes active use of force.  Because none of the UN authorities specify tasks for 
individual military contingents from different countries, it is necessary to examine closely 
the mandates ordered by the governments of troop-contributing countries.  
In light of the foregoing research, the thesis presents comparative case studies of 
Korean peace operations in East Timor and Lebanon.  The East Timor case is the main 
focus.  The Lebanon case verifies the findings in the East Timor case. 
The case study of Korean peacekeeping in East Timor demonstrates that the 
Korean force conducted a successful mission except for one element of civil-military 
activities, capacity-building.  Achievements in security activities resulted from clear 
Korean governmental mandates, with a strong restriction on use of force.  The Korean 
force mostly followed the mandate, not just implementing rigid security operations, but 
accompanying those operations with friendship-building efforts in its security tasks.  
Civil-military activities were less successful than security activities.  Humanitarian 
activities were a relative success, considering that they were a short-term activity begun 
in the period immediately following the conflict.  Friendship-building efforts by the 
Korean force resulted in positive outcomes, overcoming cultural differences and gaining 
cooperation from local populations.  The successes in these two fields stemmed from 
clear mandates.  In the capacity-building field, there was no clear mandate and no clause 
regarding deliberations for sustainable development.  As a result, the Korean military 
contingents did not implement this mission continuously and were unable to inspire the 
local ownership and long-term development needed to sustain capacity-building projects 
after the force left. 
In the Lebanon case study, the Korean governmental mandate is hard to discern 
because it is a current military operation with access to specific contents of the mandate 
restricted and treated as confidential.  Therefore, I deduce the mandates by classifying the 
                                                 
336 See both Oldrich Bures, 414 and Alan James, 224. 
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force’s activities based on their nature.  Also, the fact that the Korean force in Lebanon 
only took charge of small portions of the Southern Lebanon district presents a difficulty 
in finding statistical data relevant to the force’s activities there.  However, use of limited 
contextual resources, including local and Korean news, and scholarly works, produces 
conclusions similar to the East Timor case.  Specifically ordered mandates by the Korean 
government produce positive results compared to the obviously negative results of 
activities with a vague mandate. 
In regard to security activities in Lebanon, the Korean peacekeepers are more 
focused on fulfilling their governmental mandate.  This impacts overall security activities 
even though the government mandate does not articulate all the activities in that field.  As 
in the East Timor case, the force’s endeavors to win the hearts and minds of local 
populations while conducting security operations produced limited success in its AOR.  
Strong mandates for humanitarian and friendship-building activities brought about 
consistent and vigorous efforts among all the Korean military components, which 
produced successful outcomes.  However, capacity-building is as yet not clearly defined 
by the Korean government mandate, and there are no successes to report so far.  
Fortunately, the current contingent recognizes these problems and has initiated capacity-
building activities with clear objectives and appropriate directions aimed at achieving 
them.337 
In a nutshell, the conclusions from this study are as follows: For successful peace 
operations, troop-contributing governments should clearly and narrowly order the scope 
of force activities in all fields of engagement.  Despite claims that use of force is needed 
in more violent contemporary situations, rigorous adherence to the rule of engagement by 
military contingents will likely create positive outcomes if the force employs friendship-
building efforts along with security operations.  However, for more fruitful efforts in 
peacekeeping operations, troop-contributing governments should be more deliberate 
regarding capacity-building activities to most benefit sustainable development and local 
ownership.   
                                                 
337 Jinsub Cho. 7. 
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B. EVALUATING THE HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1: The Korean peacekeeping forces considered their governmental 
mandates as the most important standard of their action on the spot, which greatly 
impacted the results of their activities in post-conflict societies.   
Hypothesis 1 is supported by both case studies.  Korean peacekeepers generally 
tried to follow the UN mandates, but they cared more about fulfilling the governmental 
mandate.  Especially in the security operations, Korean forces sought to keep their 
government’s direction regarding use of force rather than just abiding by the rule of 
engagement of their peacekeeping mission.  Clear governmental directions greatly 
influenced the continuance of force activities designated by the mandates, while unclear 
governmental orders meant that activities were attenuated.  To a great extent, Korean 
peacekeepers regarded fulfilling governmental mandates as their most significant 
benchmark.  Clearer standards in governmental instructions are more helpful for attaining 
the objectives. 
Hypothesis 2: A clear mandate with suitable scope and contents results in 
successful outcomes of military force peacekeeping activity. 
Hypothesis 2 is partly verified by this research.  The Korean military forces in 
peace operations did better jobs in the areas in which the Korean government gave clear 
mandates, meaning the mandate specifically and narrowly described spheres of activities.  
Because the military culture emphasizes following specific directions rather than creating 
the scope of its tasks, providing peacekeeping forces with clear orders is more suitable, as 
shown by the case studies.  Yet, contrary to scholars’ argument that active use of force is 
suitable content for contemporary mandates, this research shows that limited use of force 
was much more effective in successful peacekeeping missions. 
This is not to say that following the governmental mandate would result in more 
productive outcomes than following the UN PKFH mandate, even if the mandates from 
the troop-contributing government were appropriate in regards to scope and content.  The 
governmental peacekeeping mandate fills gaps caused by vague PKFH and UN mandates, 
providing the scope and elements the military contingents need.  The governmental 
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mandate should not present absolute standards and objectives for the force’s activities in 
peace operations without respecting the mandate from UN authorities. 
In order to get more plausible explanations for this hypothesis, research is needed 
on the activities and results of other military contingents that actively follow the rule of 
PKFH without specific directions from their own governments.  Research on other 
countries’ activities in East Timor and Lebanon is also needed to supplement the results 
of these case studies. 
C. PEACE OPERATIONS OF KOREAN FORCES: LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE  
Korean peacekeepers establish close relationships with post-conflict societies with 
good intentions.  In the words of the head of one Korean force, 
During the Korean War, Lebanon helped Korea by donating $50,000, 
which was considered a large sum at the time.  Thanks to Lebanon’s 
support, Korea is now the 11th largest economy in the world.  Koreans 
will never forget Lebanon’s sacrifices.  We know better than anyone else 
the value of peace and the sorrow brought by sacrifices.338 
In response to these decent aims, current Korean forces have achieved a 
remarkable result, articulated by a Lebanese local leader. 
[O]ur love and appreciation for the Korean peacekeepers is not based on 
this support, much needed though it is.  Rather, our appreciation and 
gratefulness goes beyond that, to the relationship of brothers in humanity 
that ultimately defines our utmost love for UNIFIL and its soldiers.339 
However, a positive local reputation is not enough to explain the success of 
military contingents’ peacekeeping operations.  To fully understand the effect of Korean 
peacekeepers’ activities and gain more fruitful results from future efforts, the Korean 
                                                 
338 LBCI News, “Korean UNIFIL troops a ‘Godsend’ for Residents in the South,” October 24, 2011. 
http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news. 
339 Hussein Saad, “Bonded in Humanity,” Al Janoub: UNIFIL Magazine, No. 3, September 2012, 17. 
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government should look closely at past peace operations in war-torn countries other than 
East Timor and Lebanon.340 
What stands out from this study is that the Korean peacekeepers did well in 
fulfilling some but not all parts of the governmental mandate.  What was done well can 
be done better, and what was done wrong needs to be corrected.  This leads to four 
specific recommendations. 
First, the Korean force did outstanding work in humanitarian assistance.  As 
demonstrated in Lebanon, the medical aid service of the Korean force seems to have 
developed more efficient and effective practices since its earliest missions.  The Korean 
government should continue emphasizing medical aid service in its peace operation 
mandates, and the force should continue to actively implement and develop this field. 
Second, Korea’s historical narrative of the devasting Korean War and 
successfully reconstructed society allows Korean peacekeepers to get close to local 
people in societies undergoing similar post-conflict destablization.  Cultural exchange 
and friendship-building activities attract residents and produce positive results relatively 
early.  Efforts to overcome cultural differences by friendship-buildng have a beneficial 
influence on overall peace operations in the field.341  If Korean peacekeepers continue to 
cultivate relationships with local populations through diverse friendship efforts, peace 
operations as a whole will be positively affected. 
Third, with respect to security activity, mandates restricting use of force by the 
Korean government have changed residents’ negative perceptions of local peacekeeping 
activities.  This helped the Korean peacekeepers to be secure in their activities, and also 
encouraged cooperation from locals in conducting security operations.  The Korean 
                                                 
340 The Korean forces have participated in diverse oversea operations in post-conflict societies since 
its first mission in Somalia in 1993.  To date, Korea has implemented 14 missions under the UN and MNF, 
although only East Timor and Lebanon involved combat battalions.  However, for a comprehensive 
understanding of post-conflict reconstruction activities and more diverse lessons learned, Korean missions 
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341 International Legal Materials, 1488. The UN says that “personnel in the field must go out of their 
way to demonstrate that respect, as a start, by getting to know their host environment and trying to learn as 
much of the local culture and language as they can. They must behave with the understanding that they are 
guests in someone else's home.” 
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mandate for minimum use of force is not without irony, as the government’s decision to 
limit the rule of engagement was based on domestic political considerations and public 
opinion rather than a concern for the efficiency of peace operations.  At any rate, 
minimum use of force has been conducive to security activities, attracting positive 
recognition by residents.  It should be regarded as necessary content for future Korean 
government mandates in peace operations. 
Last, but certainly not least, the Korean government should closely reexamine the 
capacity-building activities of its deployed forces in peace operations.  Activities not 
conducive to sustainable development of post-conflict societies simply give the locals 
fish without teaching them how to catch the fish themselves.  To achieve the latter, 
Korean peacekeepers must encourage local populations to develop local ownership of 
their society.  This can be achieved by promoting local actors to participate in the design, 
management and implementation of capacity-building activities. 342   These 
responsibilities should not be held only by external actors.  The UN says regarding local 
ownership,  
Effective approaches to local ownership not only reinforce the perceived 
legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also 
help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the 
peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.343 
Attracting local ownership is important for implementing military contingents’ 
capacity-building activities as well as for the sustainability of the peace process.344  
Therefore, the Korean government mandate should include clauses clearly defining how 
the forces should support sustainable development.  Since the success of the contingent's 
peacekeeping activities stems from a clear governmental mandate, the troop-contributing 
country should specify the scope of the capacity-building activities.  Also, if the Korean 
                                                 
342 Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding Processes,” Peace & Change, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2009, 7. 
343 UN DPKO/DFS, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: 
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force will be required to teach locals how to catch fish, the Korean government should 
first educate its deploying soldiers how to teach these skills. 
I hope this thesis provides an impetus for strengthening Korean peace operations 
in the future. 
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